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The Rise and Fall of the Ultra Vires Doctrine in
United States, United Kingdom, and Commonwealth
Caribbean Corporate Common Law: A Triumph of
Experience Over Logic
Stephen J. Leacock*
"Pure logical thinking cannot yield us any knowledge of the empiri-
cal world; all knowledge of reality starts from experience and ends
in it."1
I. INTRODUCTION 2
In free market3 economies, corporate laws change over time. More-
over, experience has taught us that some legislative enactments, when
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1. ALBERT EINSTEIN, IDEAS AND OPIONIONs 271 (Sonja Bargmann trans., Bonanza Books
1954) (1954). Professor Leacock is aware that in metaphysics, "[E]mpirical science, empiricism,
takes no account of the soul, no account of what constitutes and determines personal being."
OLIVER SACKS, THE MAN WHO MISTOOK HIS WIFE FOR A HAT 39 (Touchtone Books, Simon &
Schuster 1985).
2. "The call to reform and modernise ...has reached company law . Robert Goddard,
"Modernising Company Law": The Government's White Paper, 66 MOD. L. REV. 402 (2003). See
also The Right Honourable The Lord Irvine of Lairg, The Law: An Engine for Trade, 64 MOD. L.
REV. 333, 348 (2001) ("[T]he current Company Law Review [is a] prime [example] of an
increasingly sophisticated law reform process led by government in consultation with the Law
Commission and business.").
3. "Markets are a product of human creativity...They can be designed well or poorly.
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interpreted empirically, need to be modified in order to attain en-
hanced solutions to controversies unanticipated at the time of the ini-
tial legislation. Additionally, modernization 4 of corporate law5 is,
irrefutably, a crucial factor 6 in the commercial growth,7 and continued
development of free market economies in particular. 8 Indeed, mod-
ernization 9 increases the structural strength and protects the integrity
of financial and economic institutions' ° on which survival of such
economies depend."' As a result, concepts that have outlived their
Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Violations in Securities Markets," 28 J. CORP. L. 606 (2003). Simi-
lar comments are equally applicable to corporate law concepts.
4. "[C]ompany law influences the extent to which the UK is an attractive venue for incorpora-
tion." Robert Goddard, supra note 2, at 421. This conclusion is also valid for the U.S.
5. "[C]ompany law should be primarily enabling or facilitative - i.e. it should provide the
means for those engaged in business and other corporate activity to arrange and manage their
affairs in the way which they believe is most likely to lead to mutual success and effective pro-
ductive activity." Robert Goddard, supra note 2, at 406 (quoting Dep't of Trade and Indus.,
Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Final Report: VoLs I AND II, 1 1.10 (2001).
See also Timothy L. Fort & Cindy A. Schipani, Corporate Governance in a Global Environment:
The Search for the Best of All Worlds," 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 829, 831 (2000) ("[A] sub-
stantial portion of the twentieth century featured debates among American corporate theorists
as to whether a corporation should be considered a natural entity with responsibilities for its
stakeholders or a web resulting from a nexus of contracts among self-interested individuals who
measure the success of the firm through profitability.").
6. "[T]he development of corporate law...is best characterised as a dynamic equilibrium in
which the interests of the state and the corporators were constantly recalculated and rebalanced
and one in which, given the way things have turned out thus far, unincorporated status is - or was
- at most a second-best world." Gregory A. Mark, The Role of the State in Corporate Law For-
mation, in INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE LAW 16 (Fiona Macmillan ed. 2000).
7. "The benefits of free markets, transparency, and efficiency provide opportunities for large
organizations that can take advantage of efficiencies of scale in intra-organizational synergies
and in increasing market share." Fort & Schipani, supra note 5, at 855 (emphasis added).
8. "Informed market freedom underlies the operation of English companies legislation ......
The Right Honourable The Lord Irvine of Lairg, supra note 2, at 344. The same is true for
American corporate legislation as well.
9. See Brian R. Cheffins, Current Trends in Corporate Governance: Going from London to
Milan via Toronto, 10 DUKE J. COMP. & I-r'L L. 5 (1999) "The experience of jurisdictions . ..
should be used to discover the norms that need adjustment in an increasingly global market." Id.
at 42.
10. "Despite the emphasis on shareholder wealth, few people see the current U.S. style of
corporate governance as blindly profit-oriented at the expense of the community." Fort & Schi-
pani, supra note 5, at 841. Although Lord Wedderburn, in championing the interests of employ-
ees in the mix of interests deserving of recognition when considering company law reform, has
sounded a warning regarding the power of the "addiction to the cause of shareholder value."
Lord Wedderburn of Charlton, Employees, Partnership and Company Law, 31 INDUS. L. J. 99,
108-09 (2002) (emphasis added).
11. "As trade barriers fall, markets expand, information flows improve, and restrictions on
investment disappear, it will become progressively easier for investors of one country to invest in
corporations in another. Movement towards a worldwide capital market could in turn have a
substantial impact on corporate governance in individual countries." Cheffins, supra note 9, at 5.
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utility,12 and have therefore become barriers to the achievement of
these objectives, 13 should be promptly eliminated where feasible. 14
The ultra vires doctrine in corporate law 15 is such a concept. 16 It is
12. "When resources are being used where their value is highest, or equivalently when no
reallocation would increase their value, we may say that they are being employed efficiently."
Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 10 (2003 6th ed. 2003). But see Judith Freed-
man, Limited Liability: Large Company Theory and Small Firms," 63 MOD.L.REV. 317, 320
(2000) "[E]xclusive emphasis on efficiency may mask the consequences of risk shifting for cer-
tain groups who are the losers at the expense of others.". Id.
13. "Economizing is a priority of any corporation...To do so in an adaptive way places a
priority on efficiency. . .The optimal goals of this process of efficiency are the survival and
growth of the organization." Fort & Schipani, supra note 5, at 866-67.
14. One commentator has however stated: "[Riather than being dead, the ultra vires doctrine
remains vibrant in one important way.. .corporations are not authorized under their charters to
commit crimes or otherwise act unlawfully." Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder
Analysis of Corporate Illegalitys (With Notes on How Corporate Law Could Reinforce Interna-
tional Law Norms), 87 VA. L. REV. 1279, 1281 (2001).
15. See CHOPER, COFFEE, GILSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS, (5th ed.
2000). "The term ultra vires is employed in such a variety of senses as to defy useful definition."
Id. Courts tend not to distinguish between: (1) acts of corporations that exceed the powers
articulated in the purposes (objects) clause(s) of their articles of incorporation (classic ultra
vires), (2) acts of corporations that are beyond their legal capacity, because the particular acts go
beyond the business activities that such corporations are statutorily empowered to engage in
(ultra capacitas), and acts that are within the corporation's purposes clause(s), but which exceed
the authority of particular corporate agents or officers (ultra authoritas). See, e.g., Nelson v.
Dakota Bankers Trust Co., 132 N.W.2d 903 (N.D. 1964) (Corporate activity characterized as
ultra vires, where, without complying with applicable statutory provisions, a corporation en-
gaged in commercial banking activities, although statutorily authorized to function as a surety
and trust company, and not as a commercial bank); see also Real Estate Capital Corp. v. Thunder
Corp., 287 N.E.2d 838 (Ohio Misc. 1972) (Corporate mortgage and rent assignment declared to
be ultra vires because they were executed by the corporation gratuitously). See also Harry
Rajak, Judicial Control: Corporations and the Decline of Ultra Vires, 26 CAMBRIAN L. REV. 9
(1995). "[Tlhe [ultra vires] doctrine has been held to apply, first where the company purports to
act beyond its purposes as set out in its constitution, secondly, where the company purports to
act in a way prohibited by statute and, finally, where the company purports to act through the
agency of someone who lacks the requisite authority. Id. The essential focus of this paper is
company action of Harry Rajak's first type, rather than addressing internal governance (Harry
Rajak's third and final type), or action prohibited by statute (Harry Rajak's second type), as
some other commentators have tended to do in their scholarship. See, e.g., Greenfield, supra
note 14 (other than section II, 1302-1313); Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Compliance with the
Law in the Era of Efficiency, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1265 (1998); Patrick J. Ryan, Strange Bedfellows:
Corporate Fiduciaries and the General Law Compliance Obligation in Section 2.01(a) of the
American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance, 66 WASH. L. REV. 413 (1991).
16. The Cohen Committee in England recommended its abolition some 61 years ago. Board
of Trade, Report of the Committee on Company Law Amendment (The Cohen Committee),
Cmd. 6659, 9 12 (1945) [hereinafter Cohen Committee Report]. In the United States, "[m]ost
states have sharply emasculated this doctrine in recent years, however, so that ultra vires is now
largely a dead letter. Hence, it is another one of those issues modern lawyers most likely en-
counter only in law school and on bar exams." Stephen M. Bainbridge, CORPORATION LAW AND
ECONOMICS 58 (2002).
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vexing.' 7 A number of problems emanating from application of this
doctrine to companies in England and the Commonwealth Caribbean
still survive. Furthermore, tenable solutions - such as those proposed
in this paper - to actual and potential, residual problems 18 should be
put into effect in a timely manner. In fact, attaining membership in the
European Community19 has proven to be invaluable for United King-
dom Company Law. The impact of the continuing evolution of the
European Union20 has stimulated significant corporate law reform by
the English legislature. 21 However, a thorough and complete refor-
mation of the ultra vires doctrine in England, as the United States has
done, 22 remains partially incomplete.
17. See Darvall v. N. Sydney Brick & Tile Co. Ltd. (1988) 14 A.C.L.R. 717 (Austrl.) ("It must
be pointed out, however, that the expression ultra vires is also used in practice to describe the
situation when the directors of the company have exceeded the powers delegated to them. This
use is to be avoided for it is apt to cause confusion between two entirely distinct legal principles.
When the company has exceeded its powers, it is not bound by its act because it lacks legal
capacity to incur responsibility for it. When the directors exceed their powers, their company is
not bound because its agents have exceeded their authority. But unless the company's own pow-
ers are exceeded, no question of capacity arises, and the company may ratify what the directors
have done, and may. . .be unable to set up the directors' lack of actual authority when they have
acted within their usual or ostensible powers.").
18. L.C.B. GOWER, THE PRINCIPLES OF. MODERN COMPANY LAW 233 (Paul L. Davies ed., 6th
ed. 1997) ("The present [United Kingdom company law] position may be somewhat lacking in
coherent logic and a few ghostly relics of ultra, vires continue to haunt us, but at least we seem to
have reached a pragmatic result which is generally defensible.").
19. "Over the past 25 years the development of company law in the United Kingdom has been
heavily influenced by European Community law." GOWER, supra note 18, at 54.
20. Fifteen nations are signatories to the Treaty on European Union (EU). Treaty on Euro-
pean Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719, 31 I.L.M. 247 [hereinafter
TEU] (amending Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty], as amended by Single European Act, 1987 O.J. (L 169/1),
[1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA], in TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMU-
NITIES (EC Off'l Pub. Off. 1987). These member states comprise the EU with a total population
in excess of 350 million: viz. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
See generally'Roger J. Goebel, The European Union Grows: The Constitutional Impact of the
Accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1092 (1995). Ten additional
countries joined the EU on May 1, 2004, being Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Cyprus,
Lithuania, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia and Malta. Two more, being Romania and Bulga-
ria are working towards joining within the next decade. See generally Catherine Phuong, Enlarg-
ing 'Fortress Europe': EU Accession, Asylum, and Immigration in Candidate Countries, 52
I.C.L.Q. 641 (2003).
21. "It was not until our entry into the European Community that we belatedly did anything
effective and then only to the minimum extent thought necessary to comply with our obligations
under the First Company Law Directive." GOWER, supra note 18, at 207.
22. See Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88
W. VA. L. REV. 173, 186-87 (1985) ("Before the Civil War... the ultra vires doctrine was strictly
applied by American courts... By 1930, the ultra vires doctrine was, if not dead, substantially
eroded in practice...") (citations omitted).
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In this paper, after the introduction, the formation of companies in
common law jurisdictions generally is discussed, identifying similari-
ties in this process globally, and highlighting differences with regard to
individual jurisdictions. The ultra vires doctrine is then analyzed and
discussed as it has developed in England and in the United States,
identifying pertinent factors that have led to its progressive reform in
England, the United States and other Common Law Jurisdictions
globally, and articulating its current status in modern corporate law.
II. THE LOGIC ERA
A. Formation of Companies23
1. English, American, Commonwealth Caribbean, and other
Common Law Jurisdiction Models
Formation of companies under English, American, and Common-
wealth Caribbean 24 company law, as well as under the company law of
other commonwealth common law jurisdictions is essentially quite
similar.25 Under English law, a company is formed by preparing a
memorandum and articles 26 of association and registering them with
23. This paper deals with business corporations formed for profit and "company" and
"corporation" will be used interchangeably in the paper.
24. The English speaking Caribbean territories of: Antigua, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize,
Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts,
Nevis, Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Trinidad & Tobago and the Virgin Islands. English Com-
mon Law is also the Common Law of the Commonwealth Caribbean. See Patchett, Reception of
Law in the West Indies, 1972 JAM. L.J. 17, 55.
25. The corporate statute specifies documents that must be prepared by specified personnel
and thereafter filed with a specified state official. See GOWER, supra note 18, at 14 (In England
the company's "constitution has to be set out in two separate documents, its memorandum of
association.. .and its articles of association..."). See also L.S. SEALY, CASES AND MATERIALS IN
COMPANY LAW. 86 (5th ed. 1992) ("Prior to the Joint Stock Companies Act 1856, companies
were formed on the basis of a deed of settlement - an elaborate form of partnership deed. The
Act of 1844 provided for the registration of the deed of settlement and the grant of corporate
status in return. The 1856 Act introduced a new constitutional framework based on two docu-
ments - the memorandum of association and the articles of association - and this pattern has
continued under successive Companies Acts to the present day.").
26. See generally GOWER, supra note 18, at 106-122. The articles of association govern the
internal operation of the company (they are the equivalent of bylaws in American law) and there
is the option of adopting Table A (a statutorily provided standard form of articles of association)
in the schedules of the Companies Act in lieu of preparing and registering individualized articles
of association. Indeed, if a company does not register any articles, the version of Table A statu-
torily in force on the date of the company's registration becomes the company's articles by oper-
ation of law. Moreover, the registration of articles which do not exclude or modify any
particular provisions of the statutory version of Table A, incorporate those provisions by opera-
tion of law. Of course, during preparation of individualized articles of association, any specific
provisions of the statutory version of Table A can be expressly incorporated by reference. Id. at
107.
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the Registrar of Companies at the Companies Registry. 27 On oppo-
site sides of the Atlantic, corporate philosophies with regard to the
pursuit of business activities were initially similar. However, under
the modern American model, they later diverged.
First, under English company law, historically, a company could not
legally engage in any business activity at all, unless empowered to do
so in the objects clause - or clauses - of its memorandum of associa-
tion. 28 Consequently, in practice, the drafters of objects clauses tended
to include a plethora of primary as well as secondary activities in addi-
tion to peripheral objects and subordinate powers.29 All of this was
done, in an attempt to provide the company with the greatest flexibil-
ity - semantically possible - to engage in every legal business activity
imaginable. This practice was somewhat successful.
27. In the U.S. "One or more persons may act as the incorporator or incorporators of a corpo-
ration by delivering articles to the secretary of state for filing." MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 2.01
(1984) (amended 2002) [hereinafter MBCA]. See Robert W. Hamilton & Jonathan R. Macey,
STATUTORY SUPPLEMENT TO CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS: INCLUDING PARTNER-
SHIPS AND LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 107 (8th ed. 2003) [hereinafter HAMILTON: STATU-
TORY Supp. 2003]. "The Revised Model Business Corporation Act (1984) is designed to be a
convenient guide for revision of state business corporation statutes, reflecting current views as to
the appropriate accommodation of the various commercial and social interests involved in mod-
em business corporations. This Act is designed for use by both publicly held and closely held
corporations..." MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT, introductory cmt. at xvii. See also ROBERT W. HAM-
ILTON, STATUTORY SUPPLEMENT TO CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS: INCLUDING
PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 118 (6th ed. 1998) [hereinafter HAMILTON:
STATUTORY SuPP. 1998] ("[The MBCA] was prepared and is maintained by the Committee on
Corporate Laws of the Section on Business Law of the American Bar Association. Earlier ver-
sions.. .were influential in the development of state corporation statutes[,]... were used by more
than 30 states as a model in the recodification of their business corporation statutes, and had
noticeable but less significant influence in a number of other states. The 1984 Model Business
Corporation Act is a complete revision of earlier [versions,]... was approved by the Committee
on Corporate Laws [as] the "Revised Model Business Corporation Act (1984)" and was
renamed the "Model Business Corporation Act (1984)" in 1987. It has been used as the model
for corporation statutes in 22 states..."). See also ROBERT W. HAMILTON, STATUTORY SUPPLE-
MENT TO CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS: INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANIES 94 (7th ed. 2001) [hereinafter HAMILTON: STATUTORY Supp. 2001] ("The
[MBCA] is a free-standing general corporation statute that can be enacted substantially in its
entirety by a state legislature."). In Barbados, "Subject to subsection(2), one or more persons
may incorporate a company by signing and sending articles of incorporation to the Registrar of
Companies." S.4(1). Companies Act, cap. 308 (Barb. 1991).
28. The particular activity had to be: (a) legal and (b) specifically included in the objects
clause of the particular corporation's memorandum of association. See, e.g., Sarah Worthington,
Corporate Governance: Remedying and Ratifying Directors' Breaches, 116 LAW. Q. REV. 638, 644
(2000) (Currently, "[i]n general terms, a company's capacity may be limited by the general law
(which, as with individuals, makes certain dealings illegal), the Companies Act 1985, and the
company's own memorandum and articles.").
29. See GOWER, supra note 18, at 106, 203.
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2. Modern American Model 30
In contrast, under the modern American model, based upon the al-
most inherent impulse to freedom 31 that seems to typify the American
approach to business activity, 32 almost inordinate flexibility is statuto-
rily provided. In fact, the corporate statute in force in the individual
states33 expressly empowers any business corporation to engage in any
lawful business,34 unless the incorporator - or incorporators - ex-
pressly prohibit it from engaging in specific activities. Such prohibi-
tions are mandated by including a restraining provision to that effect,
in its articles of incorporation. 35 Furthermore, individual state legisla-
tures have allocated general, 36 as well as emergency powers, 37 to each
corporation incorporated in the particular state. This practice pro-
30. Typified by the MBCA, see MBCA supra, note 27. See HAMILTON: STATUTORY SUPP.
2001, supra note 27, at 95 ("The Committee on Corporate Laws does not view the MBCA as a
"uniform" statute. Rather it is a "model" statute that contemplates that each state may make
amendments or changes to reflect local interests, needs, or problems.").
31. "[Ilndividual freedom understood as freedom from interference on the part of everybody,
including the authorities." BRUNO LEONI, FREEDOM AND THE LAW 75 (3d ed. 1991).
32. "Economic rights are as important to a larger, if less articulate, part of the population."
POSNER, supra note 12, at 705. "The abrogation of laws restricting economic freedom would
often benefit the poor more than other groups." Id. at 706.
33. See MBCA, supra note 27. Since there is no Federal incorporation in the United States,
each corporation has to be incorporated under the laws of one of the individual fifty states.
34. As a result, when forming corporations in the United States, incorporators can exclude
objects (purposes) clauses altogether when preparing and filing articles of incorporation. See
FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW, 222 (2000) (Of course, with regard to business,
"the predominant significance potentially remaining to the ultra vires doctrine involves activities
which do not have any business purpose. Specifically, if a corporation simply gives away some of
its assets, a shareholder might charge that the action is ultra vires.") (emphasis added). See, e.g.,
Real Estate Capital Corp. v. Thunder Corp., 287 N.E.2d 838 (Ohio Misc. 1972) (Gratuitous
corporate mortgage and rent assignment invalidated). But see, Theodora Holding Corp. v. Hen-
derson, 257 A.2d 398, 405 (Del. Ch. 1969) (noting that a reasonableness test is to be applied with
regard to gratuitous charitable gifts by corporations); Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48, 61
(Del.1991). See also MacQueen v. Dollar Sav. Bank Co., 15 N.E.2d 529, 531 (Ohio 1938) ("Yet if
the rights of creditors are not affected and all stockholders consent,.. .the well-recognized princi-
ple of law [is] that, subject to the rights of creditors, a corporation may give away its property or
pay out from its treasury if the stockholders consent and the act is not illegal.... Of course, in a
case in which a question of public policy is involved or the rights of the state or the public are
concerned a different question would be presented..."); Worthington, supra note 28, at 673
(writing about the English company law position: "A company can give away its assets, provided
the decision is taken for proper purposes and does not contradict any express restrictions in the
company's constitution. The company will be doing exactly this whenever it decides to exonerate
its defaulting directors.").
35. E.g., MBCA, supra note 27, § 3.01(a) ("Every corporation incorporated under this Act has
the purpose of engaging in any lawful business unless a more limited purpose is set forth in the
articles of incorporation.") (emphasis added).
36. E.g., MBCA, supra note 27, § 3.02.
"General Powers:
Unless its articles of incorporation provide otherwise, every corporation has perpetual
duration and succession in its corporate name and has the same powers as an individual
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to do all things necessary or convenient to carry out its business and affairs, including
without limitation power:
(1) to sue and be sued, complain and defend in its corporate name;
(2) to have a corporate seal, which may be altered at will, and to use it, or a facsimile
of it, by impressing or affixing it or in any other manner reproducing it;
(3) to make and amend bylaws, not inconsistent with its articles of incorporation or
with the laws of this state, for managing the business and regulating the affairs of the
corporation;
(4) to purchase, receive, lease, or otherwise acquire, and own, hold, improve, use,
and otherwise deal with, real or personal property, or any legal or equitable interest in
property, wherever located;
(5) to sell, convey, mortgage, pledge, lease, exchange, and otherwise dispose of all or
any part of its property;
(6) to purchase, receive, subscribe for, or otherwise acquire; own, hold, vote, use,
sell, mortgage, lend, pledge, or otherwise dispose of; and deal in and with shares or
other interests in, or obligations of, any other entity;
(7) to make contracts and guarantees, incur liabilities, borrow money, issue its notes,
bonds, and other obligations, (which may be convertible into or include the option to
purchase other securities of the corporation), and secure any of its obligations by mort-
gage or pledge of any of its property, franchises, or income;
(8) to lend money, invest and reinvest its funds, and receive and hold real and per-
sonal property as security for repayment;
(9) to be a promoter, partner, member, associate, or manager of any partnership,
joint venture, trust, or other entity;
(10) to conduct its business, locate offices, and exercise the powers granted by this
Act within or without this state;
(11) to elect directors and appoint officers, employees, and agents of the corpora-
tion, define their duties, fix their compensation, and lend them money and credit;
(12) to pay pensions and establish pension plans, pension trusts, profit sharing plans,
share bonus plans, share option plans, and benefit or incentive plans for any or all of its
current or former directors, officers, employees, and agents;
(13) to make donations for the public welfare or for charitable, scientific, or educa-
tional purposes;
(14) to transact any lawful business that will aid governmental policy;
(15) to make payments or donations, or do any other act, not inconsistent with law,
that furthers the business and affairs of the corporation."
Id.
The Supreme Court of South Dakota, in interpreting similar statutory language in the equivalent
South Dakota Corporate Statute, enunciated that such language "clearly provides that [the cor-
poration] had authority to enter into valid contracts." Nelson v. WEB Water Dev. Ass'n, Inc.,
507 N.W.2d 691, 695 (S.D. 1993). Such language is "an adoption of the idea 'that modern busi-
ness mandates that parties be bound by the contracts they enter into absent fraud or duress."'
Nelson, 507 N.W.2d at 696.
37. E.g., MBCA, supra note 27, § 3.03.
"Emergency Powers
(a) In anticipation of or during an emergency defined in subsection (d), the board of
directors of a corporation may:
(1) modify lines of succession to accommodate the incapacity of any director, of-
ficer, employee, or agent; and
(2) relocate the principal office, designate alternative principal offices or regional
offices, or authorize the officers to do so.
(b) During an emergency defined in subsection (d), unless emergency bylaws pro-
vide otherwise:
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vides the most extensive flexibility in the conduct of corporate busi-
ness activities. American companies are thereby empowered to
engage in the widest possible spectrum of lawful business activities.
This is effective. It has obviated any need for the profuse drafting that
English company case law 38 necessitated.
B. Ultra Vires Doctrine39
1. Effect of English Common Market Entry
In England, with entry into the European Community,40 a sense of
urgency to remove these anomalous restrictions on corporate business
activity emerged, and the impetus for corporate law reform gained
momentum. 41 However, the American approach to finding workable
solutions has not yet completely won the day in England. Upon ex-
amination, as indicated below, English company law approaches to
reforming the ultra vires doctrine have tended to become mired in
almost inextricable complexity. In contrast, the United States ap-
proach is simple and elegant, and has come closest to an efficient and
effective resolution of problems inherent in the doctrine. Moreover,
the Commonwealth Caribbean as well as other commonwealth com-
mon law jurisdictions would be well advised to prefer the American,
rather than the English approach to reform of the doctrine. Austra-
lia,42 Barbados,4 3 Canada,44 and New Zealand 45 have all emulated the
American approach. This is based on sound reasoning.
(1) notice of a meeting of the board of directors need be given only to those
directors whom it is practicable to reach and may be given in any practicable man-
ner, including by publication and radio; and
(2) one or more officers of the corporation present at a meeting of the board of
directors may be deemed to be directors for the meeting, in order of rank and
within the same rank in order of seniority, as necessary to achieve a quorum.
(c) Corporate action taken in good faith during an emergency under this section to
further the ordinary business affairs of the corporation:
(1) binds the corporation; and
(2) may not be used to impose liability on a corporate director, officer, employee,
or agent.
(d) An emergency exists for purposes of this section if a quorum of the corporation's
directors cannot readily be assembled because of some catastrophic event."
Id.
38. See Ashbury Ry. Carriage & Iron Co. Ltd. v. Riche, (1875) L.R. 7 H.L. 653.
39. See generally, GOwER, supra note 18, at 202.
40. See GOwER, supra note 18 at 54.
41. Id.
42. See infra note 200.
43. See infra note 183.
44. See infra note 195.
45. See infra note 210.
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2. England 46
Historically, the ultra vires doctrine set the legal parameters within
which companies could appropriately operate, and delineated the bus-
iness activities which they could lawfully pursue. For example, in En-
gland, if carrying on a particular business activity47 was not explicitly,
or by necessary implication, included in the objects clause - or clauses
- of the company's memorandum of association, the company had no
legal power or authority to carry on such a business. Moreover, if the
company did nevertheless engage in business activity falling outside its
objects clause, the courts declared such business activity ultra vires,48
and therefore void.49 Any suits brought by or against the company
based on such business activity failed.50 This led to harsh business
results.
3. History and Early Development of the Doctrine in England5 l
The history of the ultra vires doctrine in England is instructive in
demonstrating the problems that the doctrine exemplifies. The semi-
nal case with regard to registered companies was decided by the
House of Lords in 1875.52 In Ashbury Railway Carriage & Iron Co.
Ltd. v. Riche,5 3 the House of Lords held that a company's legal power
to do business depended upon the objects clause in its memorandum
46. Discussion of the ultra vires doctrine in England is limited to companies formed under the
English Companies Acts. The doctrine may still be relevant with regard to other entities e.g.
building societies, industrial and provident societies, friendly societies, statutory companies,
insurance companies and banks that operate under a number of different Acts of Parliament and
charters. See generally Michael Draper, Reducing Uncertainty, 89 LAW SOCiETY's GAZETrE 18,
25 (May 13, 1992).
47. E.g., pig-breeding.
48. E.g., beyond the lawful powers of the company. In this paper, ultra vires is discussed with
respect to the powers of the company as an artificial person and not generally with regard to
agency authority of an agent when acting on behalf of her/his principal. See, e.g., GOWER, supra
note 18, ch. 10.
49. See generally, SEALY, supra note 25, at 126 ("[Any act which was outside those objects
was... beyond the capacity of the company itself - in the eyes of the law a nullity, having no
effect whatever. It followed that not even the unanimous decision of the shareholders could
authorise or ratify such an act...").
50. See, e.g., Introductions Ltd. v National Provincial Bank, Ch. 199 (C.A. 1970). See gener-
ally, K. W. Wedderburn, Unreformed Company Law, 32 MOD. L. REV. 563 (1969). The decision
in Introductions evidently 'resurrected' the ultra vires doctrine from its apparently 'premature'
coup de grace allegedly delivered by the Court of Appeal in 1966 in Bell Houses Ltd. v. City Wall
Properties Ltd., 2 Q.B. 656 (Eng. C.A. 1966). See Rajak, supra note 15, at 26 ("This [Bell
Houses] decision, it has been authoritatively observed, administered the coup de grace to the
ultra vires doctrine.") (citation omitted).
51. See generally GOWER, supra note 18, ch. 2, 3.
52. See Ashbury Railway Carriage & Iron Co. Ltd. v. Riche, (1875) L.R. 7 H.L. 653.
53. Id.
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of association.5 4 Primary justification for the doctrine was articulated
as the dual protection of: (i) investment interests of the company's
shareholders; and (ii) security interests of its creditors.5 5 Concep-
tually, the doctrine was intended to ensure that company assets were
devoted exclusively to the purposes set out in its objects clause, rather
than being squandered in the pursuit of unauthorized activities. Thus,
shareholders' investment would be devoted to, and be at risk from,
business activities which they had intentionally agreed that the com-
pany should undertake. Similarly, company creditors would be pro-
tected from risks56 emanating from business activities that were not
54. See, e.g., 1 O'NEAL & THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS §8.08 (3d ed. 1992)
("[T]he corporation repudiated a contract after partial performance and avoided liability be-
cause of the application of ultra vires. The corporation's charter authorized it to "sell or lend all
kinds of railway plants, to carry on the business of mechanical engineers and general contractors,
etc." The contract in question was to purchase a concession to construct and operate a railway
line in Belgium. The court held that while there was nothing illegal about the contract, it was
void because the operation of a railway line was not in the charter. The court held that the
contract would be ultra vires even if all the shareholders had approved the contract.") (emphasis
added). See also ROBERT W. HAMILTON AND JONATHAN R. MACEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES, 275-276 (8th
ed. 2003) [hereinafter HAMILTON: CORPORATIONS] ("Riche was apparently to construct the rail-
road line, and the corporation was to raise the necessary capital."). In contrast, one commenta-
tor has suggested that "[u]nder American law, unanimous shareholder approval barred the ultra
vires defense unless creditors would be injured." MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS
AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, 129 (8th ed. 2000) (emphasis added) (citing Note, "Ul-
tra Vires" Corporate Credit Transactions, 83 U. PA. L. REV. 479, 488-92 (1935).
55. See Jill Poole, Abolition of the Ultra Vires Doctrine and Agency Problems, 12 COMP. LAW.
43 (1991) ("The doctrine of ultra vires in company law.. was stated by Lord Cairns in Ashbury
Railway Carriage and Iron Co. v. Riche to be for the benefit of current and prospective share-
holders... and for the benefit of creditors of the company...") (citations omitted). In the mod-
ern era, it has been argued in a different context, that "creditors are able to take care of their of
their own interests and do not need any other protection than that which is granted either by
existing legislation or the terms of the contract under which credit is extended." Andrew Keay,
Directors' Duties to Creditors: Contractarian Concerns Relating to Efficiency and Over-Protection
of Creditors, 66 MOD. L. REV. 665, 687 (2003). See also DEP'T OF TRADE AND INDUS., REFORM
OF THE ULTRA VIRES RULE: A CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT 14, 17-18 (1986) [hereinafter "PREN-
TICE REPORT"] ("The doctrine.. has failed to provide any significant protection to either credi-
tors or shareholders."). The Prentice Report is a Department of Trade and Industry
commissioned report by Professor D. Prentice. Actually, the creditors whom the doctrine was
intended by the court to protect were the corporation's de jure creditors (i.e., those creditors
with respect to business activities falling within the corporation's objects clause). See SEALY,
supra note 25, at 127. However, with regard to the corporation's de facto creditors (i.e., those
creditors with respect to business activities falling outside the corporation's objects clause), see
O'NEAL & THOMPSON supra note 54, § 8.08, ("The doctrine had the potential to disadvantage
[de facto] creditors if corporate participants could use the ultra vires doctrine to attack a transac-
tion that turned out to be a bad bargain for the corporation.").
56. See POSNER, supra note 12, at 411 (Corporate "limited liability is a means not of eliminat-
ing the risks of entrepreneurial failure but of shifting them from individual investors to the vol-
untary and involuntary creditors of the corporation - it is they who bear the risk of corporate
default.") (emphasis added).
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included in the company's object clause, or clauses, when the com-
pany was registered. The doctrine was therefore intended to prevent
the diversion of corporate funds into ventures different from those
enunciated in corporate objects clauses. Corporations that had ini-
tially accepted shareholder investment, and received credit, based on
lower- risk objects listed in their objects clause, or clauses, would be
confined to those objects. Companies would therefore be precluded
from entering into ventures that were more speculative and entailed
higher-risks than those listed in their objects clause, or clauses. It did
not work.
The doctrine did not effectuate its goals.57 Rather than serving as a
reliable and effective shield for shareholders and creditors as antici-
pated, on the contrary, it became a troublesome barrier to the conduct
of legitimate business activities. It was unscrupulously exploited to
invalidate otherwise legally valid contracts, and thereby prevented
companies from pursuing potentially profitable activities. Companies
were legally disabled from pursuing business activities not stated in
the objects clause of their memorandum of association, at a time when
objects clauses were unalterable 58 because of the Companies Act of
1862. 59 Ironically, the economic interests of shareholders and intra-
vires creditors that the doctrine had been conceived to protect were
being financially impaired by it.60 Something needed to be done.
III. FROM LOGIC TO EXPERIENCE 6 1
"Little by little the old doctrine is undermined. Often the encroach-
ments are so gradual that their significance is at first obscured. Fi-
57. "[Tlhe doctrine of ultra vires is an illusory protection for the shareholders and yet may be
a pitfall for third parties dealing with the company..." See Cohen Committee Report, supra note
16, para 12.
58. See HAMILTON: CORPORATIONS, supra note 54, at 276 ("At the time [of Ashbury Railway
Carriage & Iron Co. Ltd. v. Riche], British law apparently did not permit corporations to amend
their memoranda of association so that a new corporation would have to have been formed..
59. Companies Act, 1862, 25 & 26 Vict., c. 89 (Eng.)..
60. See, e.g., EISENBERG, supra note 54, at 127 ("Early cases often held that a corporation had
no power to enter into a partnership unless that power was explicitly granted by a statute or by
the certificate of incorporation.").
61. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Little, Brown & Co. 1938) (1881)
("The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience."). Similarly, in Collins v
Reynard, 154 Ill.2d 48, 50 (1992), (Per Justice Heiple, in the context of "long established practice
and custom[, liogic may be a face card but custom is a trump."). See, e.g., Keay, supra note 55, at
694-95 ("One of the fundamental problems for proponents of law and economics is that they
hold to the view that in a perfect market, that is where all creditors are apprised of all relevant
information, there are no transaction costs and no uncertainty, creditors will be adequately
compensated for the level of risk which they are bearing. But it is axiomatic that there is no such
thing as a perfect market.") (citation omitted).
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nally we discover that the contour of the landscape has been
changed .... ",62
A. Further Development of the Doctrine in England
Five years after the Ashbury Railway Carriage & Iron Co. Ltd. V.
Riche63 decision, its restrictive legal impact was ameliorated by the
House of Lords.64 In A. G. v. Great Eastern Railway, Co.,65 the House
of Lords emphatically enunciated the legality of activities appropri-
ately incidental to, or consequential upon, specified objects in the
company's objects clause. The House of Lords reasoned that
"whatever may fairly be regarded as incidental to, or consequential
upon the specified objects ought not to be ultra vires. '' 66 This reason-
ing led to court toleration of the legal viability of a plethora of powers
inserted in each company's memorandum of association as objects
clauses, in order to permit the company to conduct any lawful busi-
ness that it could conceive of, and effectively articulate. The land-
scape was changing.
Circumvention of the restrictions imposed earlier by the House of
Lords in Ashbury Railway Carriage & Iron Co. Ltd. V. Riche, is now
accomplished by the practice of filing effusive and prolix objects
clauses.67 These clauses did not differentiate between objects and
powers. In fact, it was expressly stated that each articulated activity
was itself a separate and distinct object, which was not limited by any
other clause. This approach culminated in Cotman v. Broughman,68
62. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, 178 (1963).
63. Ashbury Ry. Carriage & Iron Co. Ltd. v. Riche, (1875) L.R. 7 H.L. 653.
64. See A.G. v. Great E. Ry., Co. (1880) 5 App.Cas. 473 (H.L.). See SEALY, supra note 25, at
134 ("The company was incorporated...to acquire the undertaking of two existing railway com-
panies and to construct and run certain other railways. The question before the court was
whether it was within its powers.. .to hire out locomotives and rolling stock to another company
operating in the same area.").
65. A.G. v. Great E. Ry., Co. (1880) 5 App.Cas. 473 (H.L.).
66. See A.G. v. Great E. Ry., Co. (1880) 5 App.Cas. 473, 478 (H.L.).
67. In the U.S. judicial activism also alleviated the harsher effects of the doctrine on deserving
third parties. See HAMILTON: CORPORATIONS, supra note 54, at 277 ("Some courts avoided the
ultra vires doctrine by construing purposes clauses broadly and finding implied purposes from
the language used.. Other doctrines that have found acceptance include estoppel, unjust enrich-
ment, quasi-contract, and waiver. In particular, these doctrines were applied to ensure that com-
pleted transactions would not be disturbed, and to permit tort claimants to recover for injuries
suffered as a consequence of the corporation's conduct of an ultra vires business.").
68. Cotman v. Brougham, A.C. 514 (H.L. 1918). See SEALY, supra note 25, at 135 (quoting
Lord Finlay LC: "[Tlhe question is whether it was intra vires of the Essequibo Rubber Company
to [underwrite an issue of shares in] another company.. .The question depends upon the inter-
pretation. . .[of the objects clauses] of the memorandum of association. . .which specifically
authorised dealings in shares, and.. .I agree with both courts below in thinking that it is impossi-
ble to say that. . .these powers [were] ultra vires... the Essequibo Company.").
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where the House of Lords upheld the legality of this practice by de-
claring that each individual objects-clause must be treated as indepen-
dent of other clauses.69 This decision helped.
Then, in Bell Houses Ltd. V. City Wall Properties Ltd.,70 the Court
of Appeal took this reasoning to perhaps the outer contours of its
logical limits. The Court held legally valid an objects clause which
expressly empowered the company "to carry on any other trade or
business whatsoever which can, in opinion of the board of directors,
advantageously be carried on by the company in connection with or as
ancillary to any of the above businesses or the general business of the
company."' 71 The Court concluded that the clause should be legally
interpreted to realize its natural and ordinary meaning.72 This deci-
sion seemed to have successfully authorized companies in England to
carry on essentially any legal business whatsoever. 73 The landscape
had changed.
A jarring halt to this development was effected by the Court of Ap-
peal in deciding Introductions Ltd. V. National Provincial Bank.74 This
decision was a setback. In Introductions,75 a company was formed
around the time of the Festival of Britain in 1951, with the main object
of providing accommodation and services to overseas visitors. The
company pursued this business activity for a number of years. Later,
after a change in the shareholders and directors occurred, the com-
pany pursued solely the business of pig-breeding. In the course of
carrying on its pig-breeding activities, the company obtained from a
69. Id. at 518-19.
70. Bell Houses Ltd. v. City Wall Properties Ltd., 2 Q.B. 656, (Eng. C.A. 1966). See generally,
P.V. Baker, Notes: LAW. Q. REV. 463 (1966); K.W. Wedderburn, Notes of Cases: The Death of
Ultra Vires?, 29 MOD. L. REV. 673 (1966).
71. See Bell Houses Ltd. v. City Wall Properties Ltd., 2 Q.B. 656, 677 (C.A. 1966) (citing clause
3(c) of plaintiff company's memorandum of association).
72. Id. at 692. Cf. Jacksonville, M., P. Ry. & Nav. Co. v. Hooper, 160 U.S. 514, 523-524 (1896)
(The United States Supreme Court decided somewhat similarly, in allocating the natural and
ordinary meaning to relatively similar statutory language. The railroad had leased a summer
hotel at its seaside terminus, and had contracted to keep the hotel insured for a specified sum,
which it had failed to do. When the hotel was wholly destroyed by fire, suit was filed against the
railroad, and one of its defenses was that the lease and its terms were ultra vires. The U.S.
Supreme Court ruled the transactions intra vires. It interpreted statutory power
"to...lease. . .real estate.. .and maintain all convenient buildings.. .for the accommodation and
use of [its] passengers..." as naturally and ordinarily including the railroad's lease of the hotel,
and the railroad's undertaking of the contractual obligation to insure the hotel.).
73. Indeed, the rubric of a Note on the case asked the premature question: "The Death of
Ultra Vires?" See K.W. Wedderbum, Notes of Cases: The Death of Ultra Vires?, 29 MOD. L. REV.
673 (1966).
74. Introductions Ltd. v Nat'l Provincial Bank, Ch. 199 (C.A. 1970); See sources cited supra
note 50.
75. Introductions Ltd. v Nat'l Provincial Bank, Ch. 199 (C.A. 1970).
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bank, a significant loan which it secured by issuing debentures. The
creditor-bank had been: (i) provided with a copy of the company's
memorandum of association, and (ii) was treated by the courts as
knowing that pig-breeding was the sole business-activity that the com-
pany was currently carrying on at the time of the loan.76 The creditor-
bank should therefore have entered into the transaction with its eyes
wide open, rather than wide shut.
The Court of Appeal decided that the loan was not binding on the
company at all, having concluded that the pig-breeding business which
it conducted was ultra vires. Since pig-breeding was not expressly
listed in the company's objects-clause as one of its specified business
activities, it was too far removed from those activities actually listed
therein. As a result, pig-breeding could not rationally be implied.
Moreover, the courts ruled that a sub-clause included in the com-
pany's memorandum of association - which empowered it to borrow
money - had to be necessarily limited to borrowing money for its legit-
imate business purposes. This clause could not legally be extended to
borrowing money for ultra vires purposes. The Court of Appeal
thereby completely rejected the argument that borrowing money per
se was one of the legitimate objects of this company.77 Indeed,
Harman L.J. articulated the fundamental philosophy of English com-
pany law by declaring that a company "cannot have an object to do
every mortal thing [it] want[s], because that is to have no object at
all."'78 The question arises, however, as to whether or not this concep-
tion is rationally convincing.
Presumably, if a company wanted to expand its business activities
beyond those initially selected, and included in its objects clause, or
clauses, when its memorandum of association was initially registered,
then it should amend its memorandum to add the additional business
activities in its objects clause, or clauses. However, prior to 1948,
amendment of a company's memorandum was virtually prohibited. 79
Then, in section 5 of the Companies Act 1948,80 the legislature statu-
torily empowered companies formed under that Act to alter their ob-
jects clauses by special resolution to this effect without court
consent.81 For practical purposes, however, in the intense struggle to
76. Id. at 208.
77. Id. Clearly, the corporation did not qualify as a bank under pertinent banking laws.
78. Introductions, Ch.199 (C.A. 1970) at 209.
79. GOWER, supra note 18, at 14 ("[U]nder the early Companies Acts, the company itself had
virtually no power to effect alterations.").
80. 1948 Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38 § 5 (Eng.).
81. See Companies Act, 1929, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, c. 23, § 5 (Eng.) (Requiring court consent
before companies could alter their objects clauses by special resolution.).
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survive in the competitive world of commerce, the statutory need to
effect changes was too often overlooked.
Then, in section 35 of the 1985 Companies Act,82 the English legis-
lature addressed the problem more directly. The section targeted
transactions that the directors had decided to carry out. This, how-
ever, fell short of addressing the problem in its entirety. In reality,
other persons acting on behalf of the company may have decided upon
the pertinent transactions in controversy. In practice, corporate direc-
tors cannot be perfectly ubiquitous. That is unrealistic.
At least, section 35 had the effect of protecting third-parties who
dealt with companies in good faith. 83 Companies were now bound by
transactions that its directors had decided to carry out on its behalf,
whether or not such matters were specifically stated in the companies'
objects clause.84 Moreover, under the section, a third party dealing
with a company was statutorily relieved of any duty to inquire as to
the company's capacity to enter into the specific transaction. 85 How-
ever, section 35 did not completely abrogate the ultra vires doctrine.
Rather, a number of lacuna survived.
For instance, section 35 (2) protected a third party presumed to
have acted in good faith.86 Facially, this solution seems equitable.
Nevertheless, exceptions persisted. The good faith requirement is ap-
parently subjective. 87 It could therefore shield a genuinely ignorant
third party from the consequences of an ultra vires transaction. How-
ever, it did not necessarily protect a third party who had previously
82. Companies Act, 1985 c.6 § 35 (Eng.) (implementing § 9(1) of the European Communities
Act, 1972 c.68. which states:
"In favor of a person dealing with a company in good faith, any transaction decided on by the
directors is deemed to be one within the capacity of the company to enter into, and the power of
the directors to bind the company is deemed to be free of any limitation under the memorandum
of articles of association; and a party to a transaction so decided on is not bound to inquire as to
the capacity of the company to enter into it or as to any such limitation on the powers of the
directors, and is presumed to have acted in good faith unless the contrary is proved.").
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. This section arguably abrogated the decisional power of Ashbury Ry. Carriage & Iron
Co. Ltd. v. Riche, (1875) L.R. 7 H.L. 653, where transactions between companies were nullified
to the detriment of the third party when a company's director(s) entered into agreements not
authorized by the objects clause.
86. Unless the contrary is proven (i.e. a rebuttable presumption).
87. This can be defined as a person who acts honestly in light of the facts and circumstances of
the particular case, rather than analyzing whether a reasonably prudent person would have acted
similarly in the same circumstances. The House of Lords left intact the conclusion that it was
intra vires for T.O.S.G. Trust Fund Ltd. (Tour Operators Study Group) corporation to deal with
certain bond monies in the way it did, because its memorandum of association conferred com-
plete discretion as to ways to alleviate the losses of holidaymakers in the event that losses were
experienced. See Barclays Bank Ltd. v. TOSG, 1 A.C. 626, (H.L.1984).
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dealt with the company. Nor did it protect a third party who had oth-
erwise actually acquired knowledge of a company's objects. 88 As a
result, the section could possibly be partially nullified by continued
drafting of prolix, all-encompassing objects clauses. Third parties
could then be defeated by simply providing proof that a particular
third party was actually aware of a pertinent clause or clauses. This
impaired progress.
1. Practical Effects
Moreover, the protection provided by section 35 was limited to
transactions "decided on by the directors. ' 89 In Smith v. Henniker-
Major & Co.,9° the court decided that this provision in section 35A is
subject to a condition precedent that the board must act as a board.91
This conclusion by the court necessitates interpretation of the articles
of association of the particular company in order to ascertain the quo-
rum requirements for valid board action.92 Interpreting section 35A
in accordance with this decision would nullify the purported goal93 of
section 35A.94
In practice, however, quite a number of corporate business transac-
tions are decided on by corporate officers, or managers, other than
directors of a company.95 Therefore, decisions of non-director finan-
88. Actual knowledge is not automatically equated with bad faith, but a third party who delib-
erately ignored a provision in a company's objects clause might be treated on the same footing as
someone who acted in bad faith.
89. See supra note 82. See Smith v. Henniker-Major & Co., 2001 WL 1135246, at *4 (Ch.
October 17, 2001); see also Claire Howell, Section 35A of the Companies Act 1985 and an In-
quorate Board: One Won't Do, 23 COMPANY LAW, 96-98 (2002).
90. Smith v. Henniker-Major & Co., 2001 WL 1135246. See Howell, supra note 89, n. 10
("Smith v. Henniker-Major & Co., unreported, Ch D., transcript HC 0102108.").
91. Smith v. Henniker-Major & Co., 2001 WL 1135246 (Ch. October 17, 2001), at *5 ("In this
context, the reference in s. 35A to the power of the 'board of directors to bind the company' can
sensibly only be to powers exercisable by the directors when they gather together and act as a
board."). See Howell, supra note 89, at 97 ("... Rimer J. held that section 35A only applies to
powers exercisable by the directors when they gather together and act as a board.").
92. See Howell, supra note 89, at 97 ("It is still necessary to look at the company's constitution
to see if the board has in fact acted.").
93. Abolition of the ultra vires doctrine.
94. In Smith v. Henniker-Major & Co., [2003] Ch. 182, the Court of Appeal affirmed Rimer
J.'s decision, but based their conclusions on substantive principles that do not affirm Rimer J.'s
interpretation of section 35A and its effect. See generally Claire Howell, Companies Act 1985, S.
35A and 322A: Smith v. Henniker-Major and the Proposed Reforms, 24(9) COMPANY LAW, 264,
265 (2003) ("We are now unfortunately left with four different readings of [section 35A], as the
interpretation of the three judges in the appellate court was not in accordance with that of Rimer
J.").
95. See GOWER, supra note 18, at 221 ("[E]xcept where the company is very small or the
transaction is very large, the third party will probably not have had dealings through the board.
His dealings will be in practice more often with someone who is an executive of the company or
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cial officers, attorneys, vice-presidents and other executive agents of
the company would be excluded from Section 35 protection. For ex-
ample, in TCB v. Gray,96 a debenture executed by a director's attor-
ney was challenged on the grounds that the company's articles
required a director to actually execute the debenture. 97 Since the de-
benture was not physically executed by a director, the challenge as-
serted that the debenture was not binding on the company, because
the company's articles did not permit an attorney98 to act on behalf of
the director. The trial court ruled that debenture was binding on the
company 99 under the substantive application of section 9(1) of the Eu-
ropean Communities Act 1972.100 On appeal from Sir Nicolas
Browne-Wilkinson V.- C.'s judgment, the Court of Appeal dismissed
the appeal on grounds of common law agency principles, based upon
the findings of fact made by Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V.- C.101
The Court of Appeal therefore found it unnecessary to consider the
legal issues pertaining to the interpretation of section 35 of the Com-
panies Act 1985, that Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V.- C. had con-
sidered in reaching his decision. It is submitted that Sir Nicolas
Browne-Wilkinson V.- C.'s reasoning in the trial court's interpretation
of section 35 of the Companies Act 1985 is more convincing as an
outcome intended by the legislature in enacting the section. 10 2 Unde-
niably, the Court of Appeal was disinclined to elucidate the meaning
of this section on the facts of this controversy. This is unfortunate.
B. The 1989 Companies Act 10 3
Further progress was made in the 1989 Companies Act.' ° 4 This Act
addressed the doctrine, pursuant to the PRENTICE REPORT.10 5 In
even a comparatively lowly employee of whom the members of the board may never have
heard.").
96. TCB Ltd. v. Gray, 1 All E.R. 587 (1986).
97. Id. at 634 ("The debenture was not signed by any director of [the company], but by an
attorney for a director. There is no power in the articles of [the company] for a director to act by
an attorney.").
98. Actually a solicitor (who is an attorney in the American context) whom the trial court
ruled did in fact have a power of attorney from a director, because the director was estopped to
deny the validity of the grant of the power of attorney. Id.
99. Id. at 635.
100. See GOWER, supra note 18, at 207 ("Section 9(1) of the European Communities Act 1972
[was] later re-enacted as section 35 of the Companies Act 1985..
101. TCB Ltd. v. Gray, 1 All E.R. 108 (1988).
102. Id.
103. See generally David A. Bennett, The Companies Act 1989, 35 J. L. Soc'y Scot. 396, 469
(1990) (the article is a 3-part article in total).
104. Companies Act, 1989, c. 40 §§ 108-12 (Eng.).
105. See PRENTICE REPORT, supra note 55.
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December 1985, the Department of Trade and Industry appointed
Professor Prentice to examine reformation of the ultra vires doc-
trine.1 06 The 1989 Companies Act '0 7 implemented a number of the
changes recommended by Professor Prentice, but not all of them. 08
The implementing provisions are enacted in sections 108-112 of the
Companies Act 1989,109 and a number of them became effective in
February 1991. Unfortunately, the 1989 Companies Act did not adopt
Professor Prentice's recommendation that companies be statutorily
empowered to dispense with objects clauses entirely.110 This is
lamentable.
1. Section 110
In section 110111 of the 1989 Companies Act, the legislature's stance
shifted to a certain extent. The section permits a company to adopt
an expansive objects clause empowering it to engage in essentially any
lawful" 2 business.113 Actually, this statutory language in section 110
(a) is practically identical to that upheld by the Court of Appeal in
Bell Houses Ltd.114 The legislature's stance has not completely shifted
though.
The apparent legislative intention seems to be the enactment of ple-
nary power in subsection (a), that is not to be diminished by the provi-
sions of subsection (b), which is conjunctive. Arguably, the company
106. See generally Stephen Griffin, The Effect of the Companies Act 1989 Upon Ultra Vires
and Unauthorized Transactions, 42 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 38, 39 (Spring, 1991).
107. Companies Act, 1989, c. 40, §§ 108-12 (Eng.).
108. See GOWER, supra note 18 at 208 ("Professor Prentice had recommended that companies
should be afforded the capacity to do any act whatsoever and should have the option of not
stating their objects in their memoranda. Unfortunately this straightforward solution was not
adopted, notwithstanding the precedents for it in some other common law countries.").
109. Companies Act, 1989, c. 40, §§ 108-12 (Eng.).
110. See PRENTICE REPORT, supra note 55, at 46 ("It is proposed that: i) companies should
have an option of not registering objects..."). This solution is analogous to the American solu-
tion adopted and enacted by the individual states. See MBCA § 3.01, supra note 35; see also
MBCA supra note 35, at §2.02(b)(2)(i) ("The articles of incorporation may set forth:...(2)(i) the
purpose or purposes fro which the corporation is organized...).
111. Amending the 1985 Companies Act by inserting a new section 3A.
112. See Greenfield, supra note 14 at 1314 ("T]he doctrine sets off illegal activities as ultra
vires for corporations.").
113. Companies Act, 1989, c. 40, § 110 (Eng.).(stating that "[wihere the company's memoran-
dum states that the object of the company is to carry on business as a general company: (1) the
object of the company is to carry on any trade or business whatsoever, and (2)the company has
power to do all such things as are incidental or conducive to the carrying on of any trade or
business by it.").
114. Bell Houses Ltd. v. City Wall Properties Ltd., 2 Q.B. 656, 677. (Eng. C.A. 1966) (uphold-
ing the statutory provision: "(c) to carry on any other trade or business whatsoever which can, in
the opinion of the board of directors, be advantageously carried on by the company in connec-
tion with or ancillary to any of the above businesses or the general business of the company...").
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is not required to have a primary business. Rather, in addition to car-
rying on any lawful business whatsoever, it is empowered to engage in
all activities that are "incidental or conducive" to any business that it
actually pursues. Of course, an argument is still conceivable that a re-
strictive interpretation of subsection (a) can be imposed by subsection
(b). This argument would be based upon interpreting subsection (a)
as permitting the selection of any business whatsoever, as its primary
business. The argument would also require an interpretation that,
identification of a primary business was legally mandatory under sub-
section (a). This interpretation is not entirely convincing though, be-
cause presumably the legislature intended subsection (b) to amplify,
rather than to restrict, restrain, or qualify any powers allocated in sub-
section (a).
Of course, if each subsection is interpreted independently, compa-
nies would be statutorily empowered to conduct any legal business
activity whatsoever. For, other than illegal acts, there are relatively
few acts that might not be interpreted as incidental to any lawful trade
or business whatsoever.115
Of course, there may well be limits to court tolerance of parameter-
extension. A business activity will not necessarily be interpreted as
incidental in every situation where it proves to be profitable, or where
it generates income 16 for the pertinent company. 117 For example, in
Halifax Building Society," 8 the Chancery Division held that the con-
struction of an office block" 9 was indeed incidental to a corporate
object of providing housing. 20 It is conceded that this decision is not
115. Id. Arguably, A.G. v. Great Eastern Railway, Co. exemplifies the tolerance that the
courts adhere to in concluding that conduct by companies is incidental or conductive to con-
ducting their business. A.G. v. Great E. Ry., Co. (1880) L.R. 5 App. Cas. 473, (H.L.). See Rajak,
supra note 15 at 22-25.
116. Even if the corporation only breaks even.
117. See Halifax Bldg. Soc'y v. Meridian Hous. Assoc., Ltd., 2 B.C.L.C. 540 (1994) (the issue
of an activity's fundamental nature as being, or not being incidental to a company's primary
business will be determined objectively).
118. Id.
119. Under the pertinent statute, Meridian Housing Association, Ltd. was a corporation
formed to provide residential housing. However, in its objects (purposes) clauses, it was empow-
ered ". .. to do all things necessary or expedient for the fulfillment of its objects." Id. The High
Court, Chancery Division upheld the Association's construction of new buildings, in which the
ground (first) floor would be used as offices, and the upper floors as flats (apartments). Id. The
Chancery Division ruled that rationally interpreted, the construction of the offices was reasona-
bly incidental to the Association's objects of providing residential housing. Id.
120. Halifax Bldg. Soc'y, 2 B.C.L.C. at 540. Although, arguably, residential housing differs
from commercial housing, in appropriate circumstances, the one may be necessarily incidental to
the other, or, conceivably, vice versa.
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an interpretation of the Companies Acts at all.121 Nevertheless, it
may be perceived as shedding light on the Chancery court's concep-
tion of what constitutes incidental acts in the context of business
activities.
Additionally, although not enacted with retroactive legal effect, the
1989 Companies Act seems to grant currently operating companies
the option to alter their objects-clauses by special resolution.1 22 Thus,
if they see fit to do so, companies formed prior to 1989 would be statu-
torily permitted to adopt open-ended objects clauses by substituting
such clauses for their prior ones.
2. Section 108
Section 108 of the 1989 Companies Act 23 expressly prevents com-
panies from using the ultra vires doctrine as a sword.124 This section
does not permit the doctrine to be used by companies against innocent
third parties in any effort to invalidate otherwise valid transactions. 125
The section was intended to unambiguously confer on third parties the
statutory right to transact business with companies, without fear of
later having such transactions legally nullified by the courts. Addi-
tionally, the elimination of references to "transactions decided upon
by directors of the company" extends the protection of third parties to
a wider spectrum of business transactions. Third parties are now pro-
tected when they do business with any agent of the corporation, with
whom a third party may reasonably have transacted such business,
rather than limiting protection of third parties to transactions con-
ducted by directors only.
Moreover, although the requirement of "good faith" by a third per-
son dealing with a company was retained, 2 6 its contours are more
121. Meridian Housing Association, Ltd. was a corporation formed under the English Provi-
dent Societies Act 1965, and not under the Companies Act.
122. See Companies Act, 1989, c. 40, § 110 (stating that a company may, by special resolution,
alter its memorandum with respect to the statement of the company's objects).
123. Companies Act, 1989, c. 40, § 108 (substituting §§ 35, 35A and 35B for the original § 35
of the 1985 Companies Act). This amendment was strongly recommended by Dr. Prentice ac-
knowledging company practices of acting through agents. See PRENTICE REPORT, supra note 55
at 26-28.
124. Rather than as a shield.
125. The new § 35(1) provides that "[tihe validity of an act done by a company shall not be
called into question on the ground of lack of capacity by reason of anything in the company's
memorandum." Companies Act, 1989, c. 40, § 108.
126. Section 35A(1) states that "[i]n favour of a person dealing with a company in good faith,
the power of the board of directors to bind the company, or authorise others to do so, shall be
deemed to be free of any limitations under the company's constitution." Id.
2006]
88 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
helpfully delineated. 27 Rationally interpreted, even third parties who
may be consciously aware that the company was engaging in transac-
tions beyond its articulated objects would not be barred, per se, from
enforcing such transactions against the company. Erecting such abso-
lute barriers would be too rigid.
However, a legal distinction has been drawn between shareholder-
vigilance and shareholder-procrastination. The legal efficacy of share-
holder action to restrain a company from conducting business transac-
tions beyond its stated objects is dependent upon sequence criteria. 128
In some instances, section 35 (1) can be interpreted as disabling share-
holders of a company from curtailing business transactions that lie be-
yond the company's objects. 129 For example, if a shareholder does
take action to restrain the company before it acts beyond its objects,
the court could certainly enforce such restraints by granting the share-
holder an injunction. In such instances, the court would be rewarding
shareholder-vigilance, in taking action before the transaction was actu-
ally entered into.' 30
On the other hand, if the company succeeded in entering into a
transaction before shareholders took action to restrain the transaction,
then a legally valid obligation would arise from the company's con-
duct. Shareholder-procrastination would create an estoppel, disabling
the shareholders from contesting the validity of the transaction.' 3 '
Their failure to be vigilant and to act preemptively would be treated
as a waiver of any legal, or equitable rights to restrain the company
from embarking upon the particular transaction. This failure to re-
strain the company from acting, followed by the fact that the company
did engage in the pertinent transaction with a third party, could
amount to a waiver, justifying reasonable reliance by the third party.
This waiver, followed by justifiable reliance by the third party, would
127. Section 35A(2) states that "(a) a person "deals with" a company if he is a party to any
transaction or other act to which the company is a party; (b) a person shall not be regarded as
acting in bad faith by reason only of his knowing that an act is beyond the powers of the direc-
tors under the company's constitution; and (c) a person shall be deemed to have acted in good
faith unless the contrary is proved." Id.
128. The new § 35(2) states that "[a] member of a company may bring proceedings to restrain
the doing of an act which but for subsection (1) would be beyond the company's capacity; but no
such proceeding shall lie in respect of an act to be done in fulfillment of a legal obligation arising
from a previous act of the company." Id.
129. Companies Act, 1989, c. 40, s. 108.
130. See Anthony Hofler, Company Contracts, 136 SOLIC. J. 452 (1992).
131. This would arguably include long term obligations, thus preventing shareholders from
restraining future performances of the company required by such obligations. See GOWER,
supra note 18, at 212.
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arguably give rise to a perhaps irrefutably successful use, by third par-
ties, of the equitable shield of estoppel. t 32
In addition, by implication, director accountability to the corpora-
tion is addressed. In appropriate circumstances, certain conduct by
directors will subject them to liability to the corporation. 33 Director
action which causes the corporation to become a party to transactions,
that would have been ultra vires for the corporation to undertake
under former company law provisions, can trigger personal liability
for such directors. 34 This is a rational. The subsection clearly em-
powers shareholders to demonstrate their approval of the transaction
by special resolution. If the shareholders did pass such a resolution,
this would absolve the directors who participated in the transaction
from any liability. 135 Impliedly, therefore, a failure by the sharehold-
ers136 to pass such a resolution could indicate the shareholders' inten-
tion to leave the implicated directors potentially liable to the
company. 137 Shareholder decisiveness would provide clarity.
132. Id.
133. See, e.g., Worthington, supra note 28, at 659 ("[Tlhe common law position is... if a direc-
tor disposes of corporate assets without authority, then he or she is strictly liable to compensate
the company for the loss caused. The remedy is available against the defaulting director... It is
equitable compensation, calculated in the same way as is a trustee's duty to reinstate the trust
fund after a misapplication.").
134. See GOWER, supra note 18, at 213. The new § 35(3) states that "[i]t remains the duty of
the directors to observe any limitations on their powers flowing from the company's memoran-
dum; and action by the directors which but for subsection (1) would be beyond the company's
capacity may only be ratified by the company by special resolution. Companies Act, 1989, c. 40,
s. 108. See also Worthington, supra note 28, at 657 ("If the company...desire[s]... exoneration of
its defaulting directors from a specific exercise.. in excess of power, then.. .[i]f the restriction on
the directors' power arises because of the company's limited objects,. . .a special resolution will
do.")(citations omitted).
135. For purposes of completeness with respect to director-absolution from liability in these
contexts, see generally Rod Edmunds & John Lowry, The Continuing Value of Relief for Direc-
tors' Breach of Duty, 66 Moo. L. REV. 195 (2003) which states that "[aln errant director may
seek total or partial relief from liability under section 727 of the Companies Act 1985 provided
the breach of duty is honest and reasonable and the court decides that it ought fairly to be
excused." (footnote omitted).
136. Or a refusal to pass an absolution-resolution, because the shareholders could certainly
pass an absolution-resolution, without also passing a resolution approving the particular
transaction.
137. See Companies Act, 1985, c. 6, § 108, notes (8 Halsbury's Statutes of England, 4th ed.
1991); see also PRENTICE REPORT, supra note 55, at 29. This section is arguably motivated by
Rolled Steel Products Ltd. v. British Steel Corp. 1 Ch. 246 (1986). See generally N.E. Palmer &
J.R. Murdoch, Notes of Cases: Ultra Vires in Modern Company Law, 46 MoD.L. REV. 204
(1983)(Trial court decision); Roger Gregory, Notes of Cases: Rolled Steel Products (Holdings)
Ltd. v. British Steel Corporation, 48 MOD. L. REV. 109 (1985) (C.A. decision). Of course, issues
of liability of the directors to the company, on the one hand, and whether or not a transaction is
binding on the corporation, on the other, are quite different. Directors may be held liable to the
company, in the absence of a special resolution by the shareholders absolving such directors
from liability in other situations as well. For example, where a transaction is not ultra vires (e.g.,
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3. Section 35A
Section 35A of the 1989 Companies Act provides protection to
third parties against limitations on the authority of the board, 38 and
agents of the board, 139 by removing such limitations on the board's
authority to delegate. 140 This was intended to protect third parties
from injury incurred when transacting, in good faith, with an actual, or
apparent agent of a company, who was in fact acting in contravention
of the company's memorandum and articles. Section 35A(2)(a) 14a
purports to deal with some interpretative problems associated with
the old section 35. The language of this new subsection may be inter-
preted to have overruled any determination in International Sales and
Agencies Ltd. V. Marcus,142 that the transactions in issue in that case
were not dealings with the company. 43 Arguably, it also substantively
validates TCB Ltd. V. Gray.144
because it falls within the express or implied powers of a company conferred by its memorandum
of association), if for some reason it is a breach of duty on the part of the directors to enter into
such a transaction, nevertheless, the transaction itself is binding on the company. There is no
need for subsequent approval or ratification by the board of directors, or by the shareholders to
make it binding on the company. However, a special resolution by the shareholders might defi-
nitely be necessary to absolve the pertinent directors from any personal liability to the company.
Rolled Steel Prod. Ltd. v. British Steel Corp. 1 Ch. at 296. See also Aveling Barford Ltd. v.
Period Ltd., B.C.L.C. 626 (1989).
138. "Section 35A of the Companies Act 1985...seems to require that the board is generally
to be treated as the company. Thus it is now the case that in respect of dealings with third
parties the company is bound by board action notwithstanding defects in the authority of the
directors as the company's agents, even where those defects are known to the other party." Ross
Grantham, Illegal Transactions and the Powers of Company Directors," 115 LAw. Q. REV. 296,
305-306 (1999) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
139. Section 35A(1) provides that "[i]n favor of a person dealing with a company in good
faith, the power of the board of directors to bind the company, or authorize others to do so, shall
be deemed to be free of any limitation under the company's constitution." Companies Act, 1989,
c. 40, § 108.
140. Thus, with regard to third parties in this context, limitations under the company's memo-
randum and articles, or from resolutions, cannot legally curtail the board's power to delegate
authority to agents.
141. Section 35A(2)(a) provides that "a person 'deals with' a company if he is a party to any
transaction or other act to which the company is a party." Companies Act, 1989, c. 40, § 108.
142. Int'l Sales and Agencies Ltd. v. Marcus, 2 C.M.L.R. 46 (1982) (where a company's direc-
tor used company money to repay a personal loan obtained earlier from the defendant by the
company's controlling shareholder, the court held that the repayments did not amount to "deal-
ings" between the company and the defendant, who was the controlling shareholder's personal
creditor, although a number of the repayments were made directly to the defendant by the
company).
143. However, the court's conclusion that the burden is on the third party to establish that the
transaction was indeed one of dealing with the company probably remains intact. See id.
144. TCB Ltd. v. Gray, 1 Ch. 621 (1986), (appeal dismissed in TCB Ltd. v Gray, Ch. 458
(1987), based upon findings of fact by the trial court that the defendant knew and accepted the
unlimited nature of the guarantee in issue, thereby obviating any need by the Court of Appeal to
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Section 35A(2) (b) 145 expressly discards any per se legal presump-
tions 146 based simply upon proof that a party knew that an act was
beyond the powers of the directors under the company's constitu-
tion. 147 The knowledge that an act is beyond directors' powers, appar-
ently does not automatically destroy the prospect of a finding of an
individual's good faith. 148 A critical factor will clearly include a deter-
mination of whether or not the pertinent knowledge is combined with,
and accompanied by, an additional, judicially-relevant element (e.g. a
dishonest 49 act).' 5 0
Section 35A(1) also deals with constructive notice. 151 The Prentice
Report recommended abolition of this doctrine. The Report's appar-
ent rationale was that practical experience indicated that third parties
consider the other issues of law dealt with by the trial court; and therefore the Court of Appeal
did not deal with these issues).
145. Section 35A(2)(b) states that "a person shall not be regarded as acting in bad faith by
reason only of his knowing that an act is beyond the powers of the directors under the company's
constitution." Companies Act, 1989, c. 40, § 108.
146. Rebuttable or irrebuttable.
147. The company's constitution is a term derived from European Union provisions, but ar-
guably meaning - in the broadest sense - all internal provisions operating collectively (not simply
the memorandum and/or articles of association) pertaining to the grant of empowerment of the
company to act commercially.
148. See, e.g.. Griffin, supra note 106, at 42 ("In one respect the new Act is more radical than
Dr. Prentice's proposals, for (unlike the Prentice Report) the new Act does not equate actual
knowledge on the part of the third party with a lack of good faith.") (citations omitted) (empha-
sis added).
149. See Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn. Bhd. v Philip Tan Kok Ming, 2 A.C. 378, 389 (1995) (per
Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead:
Honesty, indeed, does have a strong subjective element.. .Thus for the most part dis-
honesty is to be equated with conscious impropriety. However, [the] subjective charac-
teristics of honesty do not mean individuals are free to set their own standards of
honesty in particular circumstances. The standard of what constitutes honest conduct is
not subjective. Honesty is not an optional scale, with higher or lower values according
to the moral principles of each individual. (emphasis added)).
See also Edmunds & Lowry, supra note 135, at 203-7.
150. See, e.g., Griffin, supra note 106, at 42 ("[A] third party will only act in bad faith where
fraud or deceit is involved. Where the company wishes to show bad faith it will be its responsi-
bility to prove it."). The notes to section 108 of the 1989 Companies Act state that third parties
are not to be protected if they are acting dishonestly. Companies Act, 1989, c. 40, § 108. How-
ever, the burden of proving such bad faith or dishonesty is on the company. See s. 35A(2)(c).
The legislative intent may be - as an evidentiary hurdle - to not make it too easy to show a lack of
good faith. Of course, lack of honesty by a director doing business in the company's name, if
sufficiently egregious, can lead to personal liability being imposed on the director upon proof of
common law fraud. However, for an analysis of directorial personal liability in tort, see Williams
v. Natural Life Health Foods Ltd., 1 W.L.R. 830 (H.L. 1998). See also Stephen Griffin, 115 LAW.
Q. REV. 36 (1999) ("The assumption of personal liability must be evidenced by an act which
transgresses the director's corporate authority, to the extent that any accountability for the tor-
tious act becomes, in reality, the director's and his alone.") (emphasis added).
151. See Companies Act, 1989, c. 40, s.142 (not yet in force), inserting s. 711A into the 1985
Companies act in Part XXIV of the Act:
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dealing with a company and its agents are routinely very busy. As a
result, they usually do not actually inspect the company's public docu-
ments at all. 152
4. Section 35B
Section 35B of 1989 Companies Act eliminates the duty of third
parties to inquire as to what transactions are permitted by a com-
pany's memorandum. Apparently, normative conceptions have been
abandoned in favor of industry-wide, practical realities. In practice,
third parties tend not to make such inquiries. Thus, based upon the
authority of TCB Ltd. v. Gray,1 53 lack of good faith cannot be estab-
lished with temerity against a person dealing with a company. First,
the courts will not conclude that lack of good faith is proven per se
merely by showing that the pertinent third party ought to have in-
quired into any limits on the company's capacity or its internal rules of
management. 154 Secondly, any attempt to establish lack of good faith
by using as a portal, proof that the third party ought to have inquired
A person shall not be taken to have notice of any matter merely because of its being
disclosed in any document kept by the registrar of companies (and thus available for
inspection) or made available by the company for inspection. (2) This does not affect
the question whether a person is affected by notice of any matter by reason of a failure
to make such inquiries as ought reasonably to be made.
This abrogation of the doctrine of constructive notice is particularly significant, because, at
common law a third party dealing with a company was deemed, under prior company law, to
have constructive notice of the contents of the company's public documents (the original s. 35 of
the 1985 Companies Act apparently sought to repeal the doctrine of constructive notice, but it
did not completely succeed in doing so).
Subsection (1) has apparently abolished the doctrine of constructive notice, while subsection
(2) arguably has left intact the obligation to make reasonable inquiries, in circumstances where a
third party is put on inquiry by specific facts in the context of any particular transaction. See
Underwood Ltd. v. Bank of Liverpool and Martins, 1 K.B. 775 (1924) (where a bank was put on
inquiry when the sole director of a company endorsed numerous checks and then deposited
them in his own personal account).
152. See PRENTICE REPORT, supra note 55, at 22. Business experience in the U.S. is similar.
See, e.g., HAMILTON: CORPORATIONS, supra note 54 at 277
("One superficially plausible justification for the [ultra vires] doctrine arises from the fact that
articles of incorporation are on public file; it seems reasonable to argue that one is charged with
notice of whatever unexpected provision might appear in public documents. From a business
standpoint, that argument is unrealistic: it assumes people will check articles of incorporation
when in fact they do not, and that when they do check the articles, they will make business
judgments based on a reading of what often is essentially boilerplate legalese. Whatever the
merits of the notion of being charged with notice of public documents in different contexts, the
decline and elimination of the ultra vires doctrine proves that it should not be applied to pur-
poses clauses of articles of incorporation.") (emphasis added).
153. TCB Ltd. v. Gray, Ch. 621 (1986).
154. Id.
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into any limits on the company's capacity, or its rules of management,
will also fail.155
This may actually exceed Dr. Prentice's recommendations in certain
respects. 156 Enhanced protection of third parties may not have been
intended by Dr. Prentice, at least in particular instances, where actual
knowledge 57 emerged from the particular third party's inquiries. Dr.
Prentice's apparent reasoning may be articulated as follows.
For example, a third party with actual158 knowledge that a board, or
an individual director, did not genuinely have authority to enter into a
transaction on behalf of the company should not be legally permitted
to enforce the transaction in issue against the pertinent company.159
Intellectually, this seems fair to all parties to the controversy. So that,
although there may not currently be a statutory duty to inquire, if a
third party does in fact inquire, judicially relevant information derived
from such inquiries should not be disregarded. Furthermore, ration-
ally, the possession by the third party of judicially relevant informa-
tion should not be disregarded, even if such information was obtained
other than from inquiries by the third party. Therefore, Dr. Prentice's
reasoning seems to support a determination of the presence or ab-
sence of good faith based upon all relevant facts and circumstances,
including inquiries and their judicially relevant product.
Of course, on the other hand, potential justification exists for not
equating actual knowledge with bad faith, in every instance. Proof of
a third party's actual knowledge of particular facts does not irrefuta-
bly prove the third party's awareness of the legal implications of that
knowledge. The presence or absence of her or his good faith depends
upon the particular third party's substantive awareness of certain criti-
cal factors. The most critical factor is the third party's substantive
awareness of the judicially relevant implications of the known facts.
This factor plays a determinative role in any evaluation of the pres-
ence or absence of his or her good faith.
155. Id.
156. See, e.g., Griffin, supra note 148.
157. "[K]nowledge in this context will require understanding and it will only be knowledge of
the individual entering into the particular transaction which will be relevant..." (emphasis ad-
ded) PRENTICE REPORT, supra note 55 at 36.
158. "[A ] third party who has actual knowledge that a board or an individual director do not
possess authority to enter into a transaction on behalf of the company should not be allowed to
enforce it against the company but the company should be free to ratify it. The same result
should obtain where a third party has actual knowledge that the transaction falls outside the




94 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
Moreover, such a third party's substantive awareness of the perti-
nent legal implications is a function of other factors as well. The third
party's substantive awareness depends upon his or her education,
practical corporate experience, and familiarity with corporate law.
Therefore, a third party may honestly, and in good faith, not fully un-
derstand, or appreciate the legal significance of particular provisions
in the company's memorandum, even if the third party did inquire.
Additionally, even if the third party did inquire, the particular third
party may not have had access to appropriate legal advice necessary to
assess the legal implications of the information obtained from such
inquiries. Such legal advice might be necessary to explain the legal
implications of the information gleaned from the third party's inquir-
ies. In the absence of reasonably competent legal advice, a third party
untrained in corporate law is probably unaware of the legal implica-
tions, and full legal effect of the memorandum of association, and the
objects clause, on a particular company's business activities.
Alternatively, even if the third party did seek competent legal ad-
vice, on which the particular third party did rely, and did act, the third
party may nevertheless have been misled. In such circumstances, the
third party's good faith should arguably be treated as surviving intact.
All these factors merit attention.
C. United States160
In the United States, abolition of the ultra vires doctrine probably
comes closest to being complete. 161 The modern American model
may therefore be the most deserving of emulation elsewhere. 162 The
160. See Harry G. Henn & John R. Alexander, Laws of Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises, 484 (3d ed. 1983). "The [MBCA] has abolished the ultra vires doctrine, except for
shareholder injunction proceedings against the corporation, actions by the corporation or those
suing in its behalf against officers or directors, or proceedings by the state to dissolve or enjoin
the corporation." (citations omitted). Id. See also Greenfield, supra note 14, at 1281 ("[Rlather
than being dead, the ultra vires doctrine remains vibrant in one important way. Although
corporations need not enumerate a single purpose for their existence and are not constrained to
exercise only specifically identified powers, modem state statutes and articles of incorporation
nevertheless charter corporations only for "lawful" purposes.") (emphasis added). See id. at
1317, note 121 (where the author lists forty-seven states and the District of Columbia that limit
corporations to lawful activities).
161. See O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 54 at 8-45 ("The concern about possible efforts by
corporations to scuttle bad contracts led to language in most corporations statutes that limit the
use of ultra vires..." citing MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 3.04, see infra note 165) (emphasis added).
See also BAINBRIDGE, supra note 16, at 58.
162. See HAMILTON: CORPORATIONS, supra note 54, at 277 ("[W]hen all is said and done, the
[ultra vires] doctrine was an undesirable one, involving harsh and erratic consequences."). See
also EISENBERG supra note 54, at 128 ("Ultra vires was always regarded by the commentators as
an unsound doctrine.").
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American approach renders the complexity of the English approach
tortuous and unnecessary. Indeed, a corporation can do every mortal
thing that it wants, provided that the particular activity is lawful for an
individual to pursue. 163 Moreover, no significant problems have
emerged as a result of the statutory grant of such extensive, blanket
corporate powers.1 64 Of Course, in the United States, the ultra vires
doctrine has not been completely abolished.165 A number of legal
consequences have been retained in certain circumstances. The criti-
cal distinction is this. Both third parties, 166 as well as the corpora-
tion, 167 are statutorily prohibited from asserting the ultra vires
doctrine to invalidate any inherently legal transaction that exceeds the
corporation's powers.168 Only the Attorney General 169 and/or a
shareholder of the corporation 170 are statutorily permitted to success-
163. See materials cited supra notes 34, 35.
164. See, e.g., 711 Kings Highway Corp. v. F.I.M.'S Marine Repair Serv. Inc., 273 N.Y.S.2d 299
(1966).
165. MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 3.04 (1969)(3rd ed. 2002) [hereinafter MBCA § 3.04].
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), the validity of corporate action may not be
challenged on the ground that the corporation lacks or lacked power to act.
(b) A corporation's power to act may be challenged:
(1) in a proceeding by a shareholder against the corporation to enjoin the act;
(2) in a proceeding by the corporation, directly, derivatively, or through a receiver,
trustee, or other legal representative, against an incumbent or former director, of-
ficer, employee, or agent of the corporation; or
(3) in a proceeding by the Attorney General ....
(c) In shareholder's proceeding under subsection (b)(1) to enjoin an unauthorized cor-
porate act, the court may enjoin or set aside the act, if equitable and if all affected
persons are parties to the proceeding, and may award damages for loss (other than
anticipated profits) suffered by the corporation or another party because of enjoining
the unauthorized act." Id.
See EISENBERG, supra note 54, at 129 (stating that § 3.04 "almost (but not quite) abolish[es] the
doctrine.").
166. See 711 Kings Highway Corp. v. F.I.M.'s Marine Repair Serv., Inc., 273 N.Y.S.2d 299
(1966) (interpreting McKinney's Business Corporation Law § 203 (1986), which is substantively
similar to MBCA § 3.04).
167. See Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. McClure Quarries, Inc., 376 F.Supp. 293, 297 (1974) (inter-
preting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, c.32, § 157.8. which is substantive similar to M.B.C.A. § 3.04 ("The
pleas of ultra vires are insufficient as a matter of law.")). See also Rio Refrigeration Co. v.
Thermal Supply of Harlingen, 368 S.W.2d 128 (1963) (interpreting Texas Business Corporation
Act, art. 2.04 (Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. 1955) which is substantive similar to MBCA § 3.04).
168. As such powers are enumerated or prohibited within the corporation's purposes
clause(s), or rationally encompassed within any enumerated or prohibited purposes.
169. See MBCA§3.04, supra note 165. See also Greenfield, supra note 14, at 1359 ("Forty-
nine states.. .retain a provision in their state incorporation statutes that allows the state to dis-
solve a corporation or enjoin it from engaging in ultra vires activities.").
170. See MBCA § 3.04, supra note 165. See also O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 54, at 8-45
("[S]hareholders can assert ultra vires but this exception has been rarely applied." citing Inter-
Continental Corp. v. Moody, 411 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. App. 1966) where a minority stockholder was
permitted by the Court of Civil Appeals of Houston, Texas, to intervene in order to enjoin
payment by the corporation of a note. The minority shareholder had asserted that the promis-
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fully challenge corporate ultra vires acts.' 71 This solution is realistic
and meaningful.
1. Retained Legal Consequences
First, the Attorney General may seek judicial dissolution of a cor-
poration that engages in ultra vires acts.1 72 Secondly, shareholders
173
may seek an injunction to restrain the corporation in which they own
shares from engaging in an ultra vires act or acts.1 74 In addition, quite
sensibly,175 liability of a corporation's directors, officers or other
agents responsible for an ultra vires act, or acts, is statutorily re-
sory note - in the principal amount of $80,000.00 - was ultra vires, because it had been executed
in the name of the corporation by its president and attested by its secretary in satisfaction of a
personal obligation of the corporation's president). See also Real Estate Capital Corp. v. Thun-
der Corp., 287 N.E.2d 838 (Ohio Ct. Corn. Pl. 1972) (holding that a minority stockholder allowed
to invalidate a corporate mortgage and rent assignment, because they were executed by the
corporation gratuitously). Of course, not all gratuitous disbursements by corporations have been
held to be ultra vires when challenged by a stockholder. A stockholder's challenge of a charita-
ble gift was unsuccessful in Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 405 (Del. Ct.
Ch.1969) ("I conclude that the test to be applied in passing on the validity of a gift such as the
one here in issue is that of reasonableness, a test in which the provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code pertaining to charitable gifts by corporations furnish a helpful guide.") (emphasis added).
In a later case where stockholders unsuccessfully challenged certain charitable gifts as corporate
waste, the Delaware Supreme Court cited the Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson reasoning
with approval in Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48, 61 (Del.1991). See, e.g., R. Franklin Balotti &
James J. Hanks, Jr., Giving at the Office: A Reappraisal of Charitable Contributions by Corpora-
tions, 54 Bus. LAW. 965, 970, 975-6 (1999) ("Currently, every state and the District of Columbia
has a statute enabling its corporations to make charitable donations."). See also Neu Minow,
Corporate Charity: An Oxymoron? 54 Bus. LAW. 997, 1001-3 (1999). See also MODEL Bus.
CORP. ACT, § 3.02(13) ("Unless its articles provide otherwise, every corporation.. .has the same
powers as an individual... (13) to make donations for the public welfare or for charitable, scien-
tific, or educational purposes...").
171. See MBCA §3.04, supra note 165. The MBCA § 3.04 applies to corporate action that is
beyond the purposes of its purposes clause. It is acknowledged that the term ultra vires is rou-
tinely used to refer to corporate activity that is beyond a corporation's powers on other bases.
See CHOPER, supra note 15. See also Rajak, supra note 15.
172. Presumably, the repeated conduct of ultra vires activity might trigger Attorney-General
action in this regard, rather than a single isolated act, or even sporadic acts.
173. Non-shareholder employees, however, have no such right in their role as employee. See
Cucchi v. New York City Off-Track Betting Corp., 818 F.Supp. 647, 657-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
("Because plaintiff is not a shareholder [of the corporation], is not suing on behalf of [the corpo-
ration], and is not the Attorney-General, plaintiff's ultra vires claim must fail.") (emphasis ad-
ded). Creditors of the corporation, in their role as creditors, have no such right either. See Lurie
v. Arizona Fertilizer & Chemical Co., 421 P.2d 330, 333 (Ariz. 1966)("The claim of ultra vires is
not being brought on behalf of the shareholders.. .but by a creditor.. .The doctrine of ultra vires,
and its resultant legal effect, should not be applied on this ground.") (emphasis added).
174. See Inter-Continental Corp., supra note 170.
175. "[P]eople who are offered blanket protections or indemnities will take foolish risks, thus
inflaming the very perils that the protections were meant to avoid." ROBERT E. LITAN &
JONATHAN RAUCH, AMERICAN FINANCE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, 35 (1998).
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tained.176 The corporation is statutorily empowered to seek recovery
from them by suing them for involving it in the ultra vires business
activity in the first place. 177 The American solution therefore empow-
ers those whose financial motivation would tend to promote vigilance.
They are motivated to act as guardians 178 of the corporation and its
assets. These sentinels can protect the corporation from the negative
consequences of ultra vires activities. They do.179
D. Reform of the Ultra Vires Doctrine in the Commonwealth
Caribbean: A Useful Example
In the Commonwealth Caribbean, the Caribbean Law Institute a80
urged the Commonwealth Caribbean territories to reform their corpo-
rate law statutes.181 Barbados did. Barbados took the plunge and re-
formed the ultra vires doctrine in its Companies Act 1991.182 The
Barbados solution is substantively based upon the corporate law phi-
losophy of the modern American model.183 However, although Bar-
bados' corporate law position, with regard to the ultra vires doctrine,
now more closely resembles the U.S. position, it is not identical. In
Barbados, "[a] company has the capacity ... rights, powers and privi-
leges of an individual."' 184 However, this legal equation with an indi-
176. See MBCA § 3.04, supra note 165, § 3.04(b)-(c). In the context of an ultra vires contract
purported to have been entered into by a corporation and a third party, the third party may also
be able to successfully impose liability on directors personally based upon the doctrine of pierc-
ing the corporate veil. See, e.g., Lurie v. Arizona Fertilizer & Chemical Co., 421 P.2d 330 (Ariz.
1966).
177. See § 3.04(c).
178. Shareholders of the corporation are in the class of guardians statutorily empowered to
bring suit, but third parties and other non-shareholders are not. See, e.g., Di Cristofaro v. Laurel
Grove Mem'l Park, Inc., 128 A.2d 281, at 286 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1957) ("[W]e have
rejected the approach from a standpoint of a competitor complaining of the ultra vires acts of a
corporation.") (emphasis added). This is in spite of the fact that a competitor may conclude that
attaining a reduction in competition with itself - by successfully bringing suit to restrict other
corporations to their intra vires activities - is a legitimate goal.
179. See MBCA § 3.04, supra note 165, § 3.04(b)-(c)
180. The Caribbean Law Institute (CLI) is a joint project between Florida State University
(FSU) and the University of the West Indies (UWI). Founded in 1988, it has promoted law
reform in the Commonwealth Caribbean under grants from the United States Agency for Inter-
national Development.
181. See Caribbean Law Institute Companies Bill of 1991, Explanatory Memorandum 2
(1991) [hereinafter "CLI Bill 1991: Explanatory Memorandum"] (stating that the CLI has pre-
pared and promulgated a companies bill which explicitly addresses ultra vires doctrine issues).
See Companies Act, cap. 308 § 17-24 (Barb. 1991).
182. Companies Act, cap. 308 § 17-24 (Barb. 1991).
183. See CLI Bill 1991: Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 181, at 2 (stating that the Bar-
bados Companies Act "was influenced.., by the Dickerson Report of 1971 from Canada, which
Report had itself received a substantial input from North American sources.") (emphasis added).
184. Companies Act, cap. 308 § 17 (Barb. 1991).
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vidual is statutorily qualified. The Barbados corporate statute
expressly prohibits a corporation from conducting any business that
the particular company is restricted by its articles from carrying on.185
It can therefore be argued that, under this section, any business activ-
ity that is explicitly prohibited by the articles would be ultra vires for
the company to pursue. This approach has unavoidably created the
following potential danger. The ultra vires doctrine may be rein-
carnated by this approach. Conceivably, therefore, when drafting ob-
jects clauses, a long list of prohibitions may develop. The length of
such a list could rival, or exceed the long list of independent objects
previously used, when drafting corporate objects clauses. The emer-
gence of such a practice would indeed be unfortunate. It would also
be counterproductive.
The Barbados Legislature has made an effort to avert this danger.
The Barbados statute states that violation of a company's articles does
not invalidate the legal efficacy of the particular business transaction
that contravenes the articles. 186 Moreover, the company is statutorily
prohibited from asserting any non-compliance with its articles against
anyone dealing with it.187 However, the corporate statutes in the indi-
vidual states in the United States have not been fully emulated. The
Barbados statute does not include the express statutory empowerment
of the Attorney General to seek dissolution of the corporation, if it
engages in an ultra vires act, or acts. 188 Nor does the Barbados statute
enact any explicit statutory empowerment of shareholders to seek an
injunction1 89 to restrain the corporation from engaging in any ultra
vires act, or acts.190 As a result, judicial assistance in furthering the
legislature's goal in this regard has become paramount. 91 The courts
will need to enforce such prohibitions by necessary implication. Such
action will not stifle business at all.
185. Id. § 18. Without explicitly so stating, this presumably empowers shareholders (or the
Attorney-General) impliedly, to take action - conceivably by injunction - to curtail violations of
the company's articles of incorporation.
186. Id. § 19. See also id. § 22. Third parties can therefore legally proceed against the company
with respect to such matters.
187. Id. § 21. Thereby converting any ultra vires controversies from external to internal reso-
lution, in the sense that: whereas, the validity of the transaction vis-a-vis action by and/or against
the company by third parties will be fully valid, nevertheless, shareholders (or the Attorney-
General) could take action to halt continuance of any ultra vires activity.
188. To seek judicial dissolution of the corporation in these circumstances. See MBCA § 3.04,
supra note 165, § 3.04(b)(3).
189. To restrain the corporation from engaging in the particular act or acts that violate the
articles. See MBCA § 3.04, supra note 165, § 3.04(b)(1)
190. The Barbados courts will need to declare these powers by necessary implication.
191. In Barbados, liability of the corporation's directors, officers or other agents responsible
for pertinent actions that violate the articles, will need to be implied by the courts.
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E. Other Common Law Jurisdictions
Rather than emulating the English incremental approach, a number
of common law jurisdictions have embraced American corporate law
philosophy, with regard to the ultra vires doctrine. In those jurisdic-
tions, the ultra vires doctrine has been abolished, essentially com-
pletely. Abolition of the doctrine has been accomplished, by granting
companies, all the powers of a biological person.192 For example, Ca-
nada's approach is instructive.
1. Canada 93
Canadian corporate law has historically been significantly influ-
enced by English company law concepts. 94 Over the last three de-
cades or so, however, Canadian company law has tended to diverge
from its English roots. This has happened partially as a result of in-
creasing American business connections. 195 Section 15(1) of the Ca-
nadian Business Corporations Act 1974-75 provides: "A corporation
has the capacity and, subject to this Act, the rights, powers and privi-
leges of a natural person. '196
Canada has therefore chosen abolition of the ultra vires doctrine,197
congruent with the American approach. In corporate ultra vires
transactions, the Canadian Business Corporation Act protects the
rights of third parties. First, section 16198 statutorily enunciates the
192. Thereby rendering objects clauses redundant.
193. "Canadian corporation laws owe much to English company law concepts. J. H.
Farrar, Commentary: The United Kingdom Companies Act 1989, 17 CAN. Bus. L.J., 150 (1990).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Canada Business Corporations Act, S.C. 1974-75 c.33 [hereinafter "CBCA"]. The Cana-
dian Constitution Act 1867 enunciates the separation of powers between the Canadian Federal
and Provincial Governments, and empowers both the Federal Parliament and the Provincial
legislatures to legally permit the incorporation of companies. Id. A corporation that is incorpo-
rated under the Federal provisions has the legal powers of a natural person to function through-
out Canada, id. § 15(1), as well as in any jurisdiction outside Canada to such extent as the laws of
such jurisdictions permit , id. § 15(2). Federally incorporated companies are subject to generally
applicable Provincial laws, and must register in those Provinces where Provincial statutes man-
date registration as a condition precedent to carrying on business there. Id. Companies incorpo-
rated under Provincial statutes are empowered to function in the Province of incorporation, but
must comply with all mandatory licencing requirements of other Provinces. Id.
197. See Can. Mortgage & Hous. Corp. v. Hong Kong Bank of Can, (1993) 1 S.C.R. 167, 190
(Can.) ("In Canada .. .the ultra vires doctrine has been abolished in most Canadian jurisdic-
tions... It would be anachronistic for the courts to interpret corporate powers narrowly when
most Canadian legislatures have indicated that companies should have all the legal powers of
natural persons.") (emphasis added).
198. See CBCA, supra note 196, § 16(3) ("No act of a corporation, including any transfer of
property to or by a corporation, is invalid by reason only that the act or transfer is contrary to its
articles or this Act.").
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validity of the transaction, unimpaired by its ultra vires character.
Second, section 17199 reinforces this substantive legal effect by statuto-
rily eliminating the doctrine of constructive notice.
Working together synergistically, these sections exceed the substan-
tive legal effect of the revised 1989 Companies Act of England. This
nullification of the doctrine of constructive notice with regard to third
parties obviates any per se ultra vires effect in circumstances where
the companies' articles are contravened.
2. Australia
Australia has reformed its Company Laws in a manner similar to
the Canadian reforms.200 The Australian corporate statute imbues the
company with all the legal powers and capacity of an individual.20 1
Additionally, the doctrine of constructive notice has been abolished
and replaced by its antithesis.20 2 However, the Australian Act does
not purport to protect a third party who has actual knowledge that the
company is acting beyond its objects.20 3
The substantive interpretation of the provisions abolishing the ultra
vires doctrine has not been unambiguous. Similar to the courts else-
where in common law jurisdictions, the Australian courts are grap-
pling with these provisions as effectively as they can. For example,
199. See CBCA supra note 196, § 17 ("No person is affected by or is deemed to have notice or
knowledge of the contents of a document concerning a corporation by reason only that the
document has been filed by the Director or is available for inspection at an office of the
corporation.").
200. It has abolished the ultra vires doctrine, as well as the doctrine of constructive notice of
the contents of a corporation's publicly registered documents.
201. See Corporations Act § 124(1) (Austl. 2001) ("A company has the legal capacity and
powers of an individual both in and outside this jurisdiction. A company also has all the powers
of a body corporate..."). See also Corporations Act § 125(2) (Austl. 2001) ("An act of [a] com-
pany is not invalid merely because it is contrary to or beyond any objects in the company's
constitution."). See generally Ian Ramsey et al., Political Donations by Australia Companies, 29
FED. L. REV. 177 (2001), citing Corporations Act, §§ 124-25 ("[T]he doctrine of ultra vires has
been abolished in Australia..."). See also ANZ Ex'r and Tr. Co. Ltd. v. Qintex Austi. Ltd.
(1991) 2 A.C.S.R 676 (Austl.); J. H. Farrar, The United Kingdom Companies Act of 1989, 17
CAN. Bus. L.J., 150, 152 (1990).
202. A set of statutory assumptions of validity enunciated in section 129 of the 2001 Australian
Corporations Act that a person is entitled to make when dealing with a company. See Corpora-
tions Act § 128 (Austl. 2001).
(1) A person is entitled to make the assumptions in section 129 in relation to dealings
with a company. The company is not entitled to assert in proceedings in relation to the
dealings that any of the assumptions are incorrect. (2)... (3) The assumptions may be
made even if an officer or agent of the company acts fraudulently, or forges a docu-
ment, in connection with the dealings. (4)...
Id.
203. See id. § 128(4) ("(4) A person is not entitled to make an assumption in section 129 if al
the time of the dealings they knew or suspected that the assumption was incorrect.").
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McPherson J.'s comments20 4 in ANZ Executors and Trustee Co. Ltd. v.
Qintex Australia Ltd.20 5 may be treated as going too far, and as being
obiter dicta. Essentially, in ANZ Executors and Trustee Co. Ltd. v.
Qintex Australia Ltd., the court was simply exercising its own discre-
tion, as it is perfectly empowered to do in such circumstances. The
court was sitting as a court of equity. The court's refusal to grant the
equitable remedy of specific performance with regard to the particular
transaction in issue was certainly viable. However, it can be feasibly
argued that the statutory provisions abolishing the ultra vires doctrine
were unmistakably intended to protect third parties. These provisions
deem some transactions to be valid. The statutory intention is to vali-
date such transactions. This validity is intended to be effective in the
face of some actions by directors, and/or shareholders, even where
those actions contravene some restrictions, or limitations on such di-
rectors' or shareholders' powers.20 6 Each case is fact-determinative.
In Darvall v. North Sydney Brick & Tile Co. Ltd.,207 Bryson J. very
effectively articulated the pertinent issues in the following terms:
The distribution of powers and functions among the organs of the
company and the maintenance of the effectiveness of that distribu-
tion is to my mind an entirely different subject to the question
whether a particular act in the law is within the powers of a
company.20 8
204. ANZ Ex'r and Tr. Co. Ltd. v. Qintex Austl. Ltd. (1991) 2 A.C.S.R 676 (Austl.) ("The
purposes [of abolition of the ultra vires doctrine] are sufficiently achieved if, despite deficiencies
in corporate capacity, the validity of corporate dealings with outsiders is made unimpeachable.
Beyond that point the legislation does not affect to abrogate restrictions, explicit or implicit, on the
exercise of directors' or shareholders' powers. ) (emphasis added).
205. Id.
206. See Claire Howell, Companies Act 1985, s.35A and 322A: Smith v. Henniker-Major and
the Proposed Reforms, 24(9) CoMp. LAW., 264, 265 (2003) (discussing substantively similar issues
in the context of s.35A Companies Act 1985, added by the Companies Act 1.989 of English
Companies legislation purporting to abolish the ultra vires doctrine in England). "Section 35A
could be used where there has been a resolution of the company in general meeting, a meeting
of any class of shareholders or shareholders agreement that, for example, the directors of Com-
pany A may not borrow in excess of £50,000 without the approval of the shareholders in general
meeting. Bank B, which we presume to be acting in good faith, then enters into a transaction to
lend the company £60,000. However, the shareholders have not approved the borrowing. The
bank here is a party to the loan transaction beyond the limitation set in the company's constitu-
tion. As the bank is a third party acting in good faith, it is entitled to the protection of s.35A,
which deems the powers of the directors to be free from constitutional limitations." (emphasis
added). Id.
207. Darvall v. N. Sydney Brick & Tile Co. Ltd. (1988) 14 A.C.L.R. 717 (Austl.).
208. Id. Articulated in human biological terms, the issue of the powers and functions among
the internal organs of a human organism (e.g. the heart pumps blood throughout the human
body, and the lungs do not; whereas, the lungs remove carbon dioxide from the blood in the
human body and the heart does not. Id. These functions are not interchangeable between the
heart and the lungs), is an entirely different subject to the question whether a human organism
can run a 100 meters in two seconds. Id.; see also Ian Ramsey et al., supra note 201 at n.99
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These conclusions are- particularly convincing because they make
business sense. Bryson J.'s reasoning in this regard is preferred,
rather than McPherson J.'s more inflexible conclusions expressed in
his obiter statements in ANZ Executors and Trustee Co. Ltd. v. Qintex
Australia Ltd.20 9 Provided that the distinctions demarcated by Bryson
J. are adhered to in interpreting and applying these statutory provi-
sions, the task of refinement will not be insuperable, as the Australian
courts continue their future interpretive tasks.
3. New Zealand
New Zealand's reforms are similar to the Canadian and Australian
reforms, with companies statutorily equated with individuals.210 In
addition to abolishing the doctrine of constructive notice of a com-
pany's registered documents, 211 the reforms also statutorily target the
issue of the corporation's lack of capacity. The reforms prohibit the
issue of lack of capacity from being raised to invalidate actions taken
by the company.212 They also embrace the U.S. solution selected in
the MBCA. 21 3 Thus, in proceedings by the company itself,214 its mem-
bers,2 15 or the Registrar of Companies, 216 the ultra vires issue can be
validly raised. The company or its members are empowered to pro-
ceed against the company's officers217 with respect to such transac-
tions. Moreover, acting preemptively, members of the company may
("Although the expression ultra vires is sometime used in respect of acts of both individuals or
corporations who act beyond their powers, in the context of corporate law, the expression should
be used in the narrow sense of being confined to acts by a company with limited capacity beyond
its corporate power. With the abolition of the doctrine of ultra vires in Australia, an act of a
director in disregard of the interests of the company only affects the validity of the director's acts
and does not affect the validity of the corporate action. Directors are under an obligation to
ensure that company powers and funds are used only for company purposes.") (emphasis added)
(citations omitted).
209. See ANZ Ex'r and Tr. Co. Ltd., supra note 204.
210. See THE LAWS OF NEW ZEALAND (LexisNexis 2003); Companies Act 1993, 1993 S.R. No.
105 (N.Z.) [hereinafter NZCA] (amending the Companies Act 1955 and adding a general provi-
sion in § 15A(1), which created for companies the same rights, powers, and privileges as those of
a natural person). Additional enunciated statutory powers were conferred on companies under
§ 15A(2). Id. See also Farrar, supra note 193, at 152.
211. NZCA §18B.
212. NZCA § 18A(1).
213. See MBCA § 3.04, supra note 165.
214. See NZCA § 18A(2)(a)(b). Proceedings by the company against its officers responsible
for embroiling it in the ultra vires transaction(s).
215. Id.
216. See Companies Act § 18A(2)(c). The Registrar's action would take the form of a wind-
ing-up application.
217. See, e.g., MBCA § 3.04, supra note 165, § 3.04(b)(2).
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file suit to prevent the ultra vires transaction218 or may seek other
relief in this regard.219
In addition, a third party's actual knowledge of a company's lack of
capacity is not irrelevant.220 The Act clearly acknowledges a distinc-
tion between concepts of constructive notice and actual knowledge.
With respect to persons who knew, or ought to have known of the
company's lack of capacity, the company, or a guarantor of its obliga-
tions may be able to assert the company's lack of capacity in some
actions based on such transactions.221 This can be used by the corpo-
ration or its guarantor in appropriate circumstances to prevent third
parties from exploiting, conceivably through cunning and deliberation,
the abolition of the ultra vires doctrine in particular transactions.
The later New Zealand Companies Act 1993 reenacts a company's
legal power to exercise all the rights of an individual.222 Certainly,
provisions can be included in a company's constitution that are restric-
tive rather than empowering.223 However, since under this Act, the
articulation of objects is not required, 224 incorporators have flexibility.
Thus, virtually complete abolition of the ultra vires doctrine, as has
been accomplished in the United States.225 is also attainable in New
218. NZCA § 18A(2)(a). In addition to members of the company, its debenture holders, or
the trustee(s) for debenture holders are similarly statutorily empowered to take similar action
under this provision. Id. Under § 18A(3), in any such actions for an injunction to prevent the
company from performing any contract(s) to which the corporation is a party, provisions similar
to the MBCA §3.04(c) apply. Compare NZCA § 18A and MBCA § 3.04, supra note 165,
§ 3.04(c). In these actions, the court is empowered to provide relief relating to any losses that
arise from its decision in favor of granting the injunction. Id. However, by analogy to the MBCA
§3.04, NZCA § 18A(4) prohibits the court from including loss of profits in any relief that it
decides to grant. Id.
219. NZCA § 18A(2)(a)
220. This is in harmony with Professor Prentice's conclusions. See PRENTICE REPORT, supra
note 55 at 36,.
221. NZCA § 18C(1); NZCA § 18(1). See also Equiticorp Indus. Group Ltd. v. The Crown
(No 47) (1996) 3 N.Z.L.R. 586 (summary of the Equiticorp judgment) (The proviso to § 18C(1)
prevents a party relying on the section if "that person knows or by reason of his position with or
relationship to the company ought to know" of the lack of authority. The proviso has not been
the subject of any detailed examination in the cases in this jurisdiction so far. The meaning to be
given to the phrase "position with or relationship to" is not limited to an inside relationship with
the company, but requires an ongoing relationship. The meaning of the words "ought to know"
... differs from the common law concept of being "put on inquiry" and requires something more
.... Therefore information acquired is only relevant if it forms part of the relationship between
the person and company. Id.
222. NZCA § 16(1).
223. NZCA § 16(2).
224. This emulates the MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §2.02(b)(2)(I) which makes the articulation of
objects (purposes) for which the company is created permissive only.
225. See MBCA §3.04, supra note 165.
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Zealand by declining to include objects in the company's registered
documents.
4. Northern Ireland
Legislation modifying and reforming the ultra vires doctrine in
Northern Ireland corporate law,226 in terms substantively equivalent
to the English Companies Act 1989, was enacted in 1990.227 Since
these Northern Ireland corporate law provisions parallel those in the
English Companies Act 1989,228 issues similar to those discussed in
this paper pertaining to interpretation are equally applicable in both
jurisdictions.
IV. CONCLUSION
Business efficiency is elusive. However, with respect to the elimina-
tion of the ultra vires doctrine in the corporate law of common law
jurisdictions, experience has taught significant lessons. Enforcement
of transactions that persons can legally execute should, on principle,
be treated similarly. After all, companies are persons too.2 29 Similar
enforcement is therefore equally tenable. Legally valid transactions
entered into by artificial persons should be fully enforced, whether
they are companies formed under the companies Acts of England, the
United States, territories of the Commonwealth Caribbean or other
Commonwealth common law jurisdictions. The best progress has
been made in the United States and in those countries that have emu-
lated the American model of abrogation of the ultra vires doctrine.
Since joining the European Common Market, later the European
Union, the English legislature has also enacted significant reforms.
The lesson from experience is clear. The eradication of any negative,
tenacious relics of the corporate ultra vires doctrine will effectively
assist in the unenviable task of corporate modernization.
226. "[Flollowing the enactment of the 1963 Companies Act .... Irish company law was
largely based on the English model. However .... since 1990 a number of pieces of legislation
have been enacted specifically to address issues arising in the context of the continued develop-
ment and expansion of the Irish economy, and the consequent growth in corporate and commer-
cial activity .... [L]egislation enacted in 1990 does not represent a complete overhaul of the basic
principles of company law. Instead particular issues are addressed .... Irene Lynch-Fannon,
Enforcement and Compliance in Irish Company Law: All Law and No Enforcement or The
Dawn of A New Era," 2002 THE INSOLVENCy LAW. 14.
227. In the Companies (No. 2) (N.I.) Order 1990, which amended a number of provisions in
the Companies (NI) Order 1986. See Griffin, supra note 106, at 39.
228. Id.
229. Albeit artificial ones.
[Vol. 5:67
